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RACE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Ric Simmons 
Abstract 
The current political moment requires society to rethink the ways that 
race impacts policing. Many of the solutions will be political in nature, 
but legal reform is necessary as well. Law enforcement officers have a 
long history of considering a suspect’s race when conducting criminal 
investigations. The civil rights movement and the progressive criminal 
justice decisions of the Warren Court mitigated the explicit use of race as 
a factor, but there is ample evidence that many modern police officers 
still openly or implicitly use race to guide their investigative decisions. 
This Article examines and critiques how courts have historically 
analyzed the question of race in the context of determining reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. There are two constitutional provisions that 
regulate whether and how the police can use race as a factor to meet the 
legal standards: the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, police can only use race as a factor if race 
is relevant to the likelihood that the suspect is engaged in criminal 
activity. In theory, there could be a relationship between race and 
criminal activity in a narrow subset of cases. But in reality, police and 
courts rely on dubious anecdotal data to support this relationship and 
conduct flawed statistical analysis to calculate the strength of the 
relationship. Also, much of the data that exists is tainted by decades of 
biased policing and prosecuting. Because there is a small subset of cases 
in which a correlation between race and crime may exist, this country 
needs a legal reform that requires prosecutors to demonstrate the 
existence and strength of the correlation through empirical data rather 
than through the subjective experiences of law enforcement. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, police officers may only explicitly 
use race to support individualized suspicion if the use of race is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest and there is no race-neutral 
factor that would also satisfy that interest. Although one would expect 
this standard to severely limit the use of race in criminal investigations, 
courts have allowed police to use race in a surprising number of cases. In 
many cases, courts do not even find that the explicit use of race triggers 
strict scrutiny. In other cases, when so-called race neutral factors trigger 
disparate impact, the evidentiary burden shifts to criminal defendants to 
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prove that the race-neutral factor was applied with discriminatory 
purpose—a standard which is nearly impossible to establish. Even when 
strict scrutiny is triggered, courts have often been willing to conclude that 
crime control is a compelling state interest and that the use of race is 
narrowly tailored to meet that interest. This Article argues that courts in 
criminal cases must apply an Equal Protection test identical to the test 
used in civil cases in order to limit the use of race in criminal 
investigations, thereby limiting the practice to the rare instances when it 
is truly necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This country is undergoing a long-overdue examination of race and 
policing. This examination reaches into every aspect of policing, from 
how officers use force to where police departments choose to spend their 
resources. The current movement even questions the continued existence 
of police forces as in their current form, with many advocates arguing 
that the systemic racism found throughout the criminal justice system 
2
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mandates the creation of new agencies with completely different 
conceptions of law enforcement and public safety.1 
Most of these changes will be the result of political action, whether 
from city councils, state legislatures, or even federal intervention. But in 
addition to the new legislative rules that will be created to govern police 
conduct, courts must also challenge some longstanding legal principles 
regarding race and criminal justice. Specifically, courts need to re-
examine whether and under what circumstances police can consider a 
suspect’s race2 when conducting a criminal investigation.  
Conventional wisdom dictates that the Constitution precludes law 
enforcement from relying on race. However, the question of whether a 
suspect’s race can be a factor in determining probable cause—or its less 
robust cousin, reasonable suspicion—is more complex than it first 
appears. Courts are divided as to when it is appropriate for police officers 
to use race in determining whether to stop or search a suspect, and legal 
 
 1. See Rashawn Ray, What Does ‘Defund the Police’ Mean and Does It Have Merit?, 
BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (June 19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/19/what-
does-defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-have-merit/ [https://perma.cc/R8CW-NNCN]. 
 2.  Traditionally, the United States has defined race according to the “one-drop rule,” 
wherein a person is considered Black if anyone at all in their ancestry is Black, i.e., even a “drop” 
of Black blood makes someone Black. See Gordon Hodson, Race as a Social Construction, 
PSYCH. TODAY (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/without-prejudice/ 
201612/race-social-construction [https://perma.cc/3PZB-YLGN]. Accordingly, American society 
has operated as though race is defined by genetic differences. See Megan Gannon, Race Is a Social 
Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
article/race-is-a-social-construct-scientists-argue/ [https://perma.cc/E9ZL-MZDU]. However, the 
prevailing view among scientists today is that race is merely a social construct with no biological 
basis. Id. (“What the study of complete genomes from different parts of the world has shown is 
that even between Africa and Europe, for example, there is not a single absolute genetic 
difference, meaning no single variant where all Africans have one variant and all Europeans 
another one, even when recent migration is disregarded . . . .”). Race, in other words, is not 
inherent; rather, it is a psychological concept based on “rules” that society has agreed on about 
what it means to be “white” or “black.” See Hodson, supra. That is not to say that race is not 
“real.” Id. “On the contrary, it has very real meaning and is of psychological, political, and legal 
significance,” id., as evidenced by the glaring disparities between white and Black Americans in 
government representation, healthcare, pay, and more, see Katherine Tate, The Political 
Representation of Blacks in Congress: Does Race Matter?, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 623, 623 (2001); 
Angela Hanks et al., Systematic Inequality: How America’s Structural Racism Helped Create the 
Black-White Wealth Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 21, 2018, 9:03 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/3QDG-4GDP]; Risa Lavizzo-Mourey & David Williams, Being Black Is Bad 
for Your Health, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/ 
opinion/blogs/policy-dose/articles/2016-04-14/theres-a-huge-health-equity-gap-between-whites-
and-minorities [https://perma.cc/D7SS-N76Y]. Simply put, race is real in the psychological sense, 
not the biological sense. Subsequently, when it comes to reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
based on race, it is not the suspect’s “biological” race (as there is no such thing) that will influence 
the law enforcement officer’s decision but rather the race as perceived by the law enforcement 
officer.  
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standards vary depending on context.3 In some circumstances, such as 
conducting Terry stops,4 courts have not only held that race is irrelevant 
under the Fourth Amendment, but also that using race as a factor in 
determining individualized suspicion violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.5 In other contexts, such as profiling suspected drug couriers or 
terrorists, courts have reluctantly allowed race to be a legitimate factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion.6 And in the immigration context, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly allowed the use of race as a factor, 
holding that it “clearly is relevant” to the criminal investigation.7  
Police using race to direct criminal investigations is nothing new. Law 
enforcement agencies have a long history of relying on a suspect’s race.8 
While the civil rights movement and the progressive criminal justice 
decisions of the Warren Court mitigated the explicit use of race as a factor 
in criminal investigations, there is ample evidence that many law 
enforcement investigations still openly or implicitly consider the 
suspect’s race.9  
This Article examines and critiques courts’ analysis of race in the 
context of determining reasonable suspicion or probable cause. There are 
two constitutional provisions that regulate whether and how the police 
can use race as a factor to guide their criminal investigations: the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, police can only use race as a factor if race is relevant to the 
likelihood that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity.10 Theoretically, 
race could be a relevant factor to this analysis; in practice, however, 
courts have an extremely poor track record in appropriately analyzing this 
factor. Courts have often given too much weight to anecdotal data and 
 
 3. See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. All courts agree that if an eyewitness 
indicates that the perpetrator was a certain race, police can use race as a factor in determining 
whether to stop or arrest a suspect—but even that practice can be problematic. See infra notes 61–
78 and accompanying text. 
 4.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). In this context, Terry stops include traffic 
stops.  
 5.  See infra notes 50–52, 177 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See infra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
 7.  United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564 n.17 (1976); see also United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (holding that Mexican ancestry alone was not enough 
to justify a stop). For a further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 132–36 and accompanying 
text.  
 8.  See infra notes 19–27 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Whren v. United States 517 U.S. 806, 813–14, 817 (1996) (stating that selective 
enforcement of the law cannot be based on race); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87 (admitting 
that race could be a factor in enforcing immigration laws because race was relevant to the 
likelihood that one was here illegally). 
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have frequently misused statistical data when it is available.11 
Furthermore, much of the statistical data that exists is tainted by biased 
policing and prosecuting.12 This Article argues that the state should bear 
the burden of proving both the existence and the strength of any 
correlation through actual data rather than relying on arresting officers’ 
subjective experiences. Courts should also adopt a reliable and consistent 
methodology when applying that data.  
Under the Equal Protection Clause, police can only use race as a factor 
if their use of race is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest 
and no race-neutral alternative is available.13 In theory, this constitutional 
standard should severely limit the use of race. But in the criminal law 
context, the Equal Protection jurisprudence is inconsistent. Some courts 
conclude that crime control is a compelling state interest and then apply 
a lenient standard in their analysis of whether the use of race is narrowly 
tailored to meet that interest.14 Other courts require defendants to prove a 
discriminatory purpose, which can be extremely difficult in the law 
enforcement context.15 Still other courts fail to apply the Equal Protection 
Clause at all, relying only on the Fourth Amendment to determine 
whether the use of race is appropriate.16 This Article proposes specific 
criteria as to how courts should apply the Equal Protection Clause when 
evaluating the use of race in criminal investigations. 
Part I briefly examines the various ways in which police have used 
race in criminal investigations. Part II reviews how courts have applied 
the Fourth Amendment to race in criminal cases and examines the 
conditions under which race could potentially be a legitimate factor for 
police to consider in their investigations. This discussion gives special 
attention to the immigration context. Immigration cases involve a strong 
argument for using race as a legitimate factor under the Fourth 
Amendment, but they also expose the most obvious fallacies in courts’ 
analyses.17 Part III examines the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause in the criminal justice context, noting the sparse number of 
criminal procedure cases that have even applied the Equal Protection 
Clause, and then discussing the challenge of applying generalized Equal 
Protection doctrine to the early stages of criminal investigations. Finally, 
Part IV proposes changes to the way in which courts approach the 
 
 11. See infra notes 36–39, 52–55 and accompanying text. Much of this data is also tainted 
because, for a variety of reasons, racial minorities have disproportionate contact with the criminal 
justice system. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 39, 123 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 255–257, 273 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 209, 220 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 135–172 and accompanying text. 
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question of using race as an acceptable factor in determining 
particularized suspicion.  
I.  A (VERY BRIEF) HISTORY OF RACE-BASED POLICING 
For much of this country’s history, sections of the substantive criminal 
law have explicitly discriminated against Black Americans;18 thus, it was 
inevitable that law enforcement officers used race as a factor when 
investigating those crimes. Some scholars have argued that the modern-
day police patrols can be traced to slave patrols in the southern colonies 
during the eighteenth century.19 These patrols were empowered by all-
white legislatures to search the homes of Black slaves and punish free 
Blacks who could not prove they were free.20 The victims of these patrols 
were targeted solely because of their race.21 Others have argued that 
modern police forces in the south during Reconstruction were created to 
control the newly freed Black citizens migrating from plantations into 
 
 18. There are several terms used to identify Black Americans, including African American, 
Black, or person of color. In a 2019 social media survey, most people said that “they would prefer 
to be recognized as Black before African-American or a Person of Color,” stating that “it was 
more inclusive of the black experience in America, regardless of origin,” while others preferred 
“African-American” to acknowledge both their origins in the African continent and their history 
on the American continent. Michael Quander & Lauryn Froneberger, Black vs. African-American: 
The Complex Conversation Black Americans Are Having About Identity #ForTheCulture, 
WUSA9 (May 30, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/dc/black-vs-
african-american-the-complex-conversation-black-americans-are-having-about-identity-forthe 
culture/65-80dde243-23be-4cfb-9b0f-bf5898bcf069 [https://perma.cc/W4M7-NXWB]. 
In today’s world, “Black” seems to be the prevailing preference. Id.; see also Joshua 
Adams, Why We Need to Stop Saying ‘People of Color’ When We Mean ‘Black People,’ MEDIUM: 
LEVEL (Oct. 17, 2018), https://level.medium.com/we-should-stop-saying-people-of-color-when-
we-mean-black-people-29c2b18e6267 [https://perma.cc/HA63-7YUJ] (“[The phrase ‘people of 
color’] acknowledges how racism and white supremacy affect people from many groups, not just 
Black people, and is a platform for their collective shared experiences and concerns. However, it 
has its limits—and that’s why we need to stop saying ‘people of color’ when we mostly (and 
sometimes only) mean ‘Black people.’ . . . Saying ‘POC’ when we mean ‘Black people’ concedes 
that there’s a need to describe a marginalized group as ‘less’ Black for people to have empathy 
for an issue.”). Accordingly, this Article uses the term “Black” throughout; ultimately, however, 
the appropriate term should be chosen by the individual being referred to. 
 19. See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 336 
(1998); Sidney Harring, The Development of the Police Institution in the United States, CRIME & 
SOC. JUST., Spring-Summer 1976, at 54, 57. 
 20. Mikah K. Thompson, A Culture of Silence: Exploring the Impact of the Historically 
Contentious Relationship Between African-Americans and the Police, 85 UMKC L. REV. 697, 
716 (2017); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 94, 109 (2006). 
 21. See Maclin, supra note 19, at 335. 
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cities.22 According to this narrative, modern-day policing can trace its 
roots back to practices that were explicitly race-based.  
After the civil war, southern states created a new set of laws, known 
as the “Black Codes,” which in part imposed criminal punishment on 
Black Americans who engaged in specified activities such as “using 
insulting gestures or language” or preaching without a license.23 These 
laws were eventually replaced by Jim Crow laws, which enforced formal 
segregation.24 Since Jim Crow laws discriminated based on race, police 
officers legally targeted Blacks in enforcing them.25 Although northern 
states were relatively free of explicitly race-based criminal codes, police 
in northern towns and cities often failed to enforce criminal laws when 
whites committed acts of violence against Blacks.26 All of this 
contributed to a legacy in which police officers could act as the 
instruments of white supremacy, leading to a perception that “law 
enforcement exists to control Blacks rather than protect them.”27 
The civil rights movement and the subsequent repudiation of laws that 
explicitly discriminated on the basis of race has mitigated the use of race 
as a factor in law enforcement investigation,28 but the practice persists. In 
recent history, the use of race in criminal investigations has been mostly, 
but not exclusively, implicit rather than explicit. Police officers use race 
and economic class, which is correlated to race, as a “proxy for 
criminality” and an “indicator of dangerousness.”29 As Professor Carol 
Steiker notes: 
[B]lacks found walking in white neighborhoods, traveling 
on interstate buses, or committing minor traffic offenses are 
 
 22. See Harring, supra note 19, at 56–57; see also Thompson, supra note 20, at 717 (“[T]he 
widespread existence of slave patrols in the South must be considered alongside the development 
of modern policing organizations in the North when describing the evolution of American law 
enforcement.”). 
 23. Thompson, supra note 20, at 718 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sandra Bass, 
Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 
28 SOC. JUST. 156, 160 (2001)). 
 24. Id. at 719. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 719–20. 
 27. Id. at 720. 
 28. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s made it politically unpopular for police 
to use race as a factor in investigations or enforcement. Even during the protests of the civil rights 
movement, police could not respond too strongly, or they would encourage further protest. See id. 
at 721. The progressive decisions of the Warren Court also limited the ability of police to take 
race into account during criminal investigations. See Brooks Holland, Racial Profiling and a 
Punitive Exclusionary Rule, 20 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 29, 34–35 (2010); Mark Tushnet, 
Observations on the New Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627, 
1632 (2006). 
 29. Carol S. Steiker, Response, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
820, 840 (1994). 
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much more likely to be stopped, searched, and subjected to 
brutal treatment than similarly situated white people. 
Moreover, prevalent racial segregation in housing allows for 
more aggressive and intrusive policing of black and other 
minority neighborhoods than of white or mixed 
communities . . . .30 
Many courts have recognized the persistence of the use of race in 
criminal investigations.31 Occasionally, law enforcement officers are 
transparent about the fact that they considered a suspect’s race in their 
investigation;32 more often, the reliance on race can be determined 
through statistical analysis.33 Throughout the late twentieth century, some 
 
 30. Id. at 840–41 (footnotes omitted); see also Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue 
Encounters” - Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race 
Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 253 (1991) (“Black men know they are liable to be stopped at 
any time, and that when they question the authority of the police, the response from the cops is 
often swift and violent. This applies to black men of all economic strata, regardless of their level 
of education, and whatever their job status or place in the community.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 31. Holland, supra note 28, at 36 & n.35 (citing multiple cases); see, e.g., United States v. 
Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 n.24 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“A significant body of 
research shows that race is routinely and improperly used as a proxy for criminality, and is often 
the defining factor in police officer’s decisions to arrest, stop or frisk potential suspects.”); Chavez 
v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing cases that recognize the existence 
of racial profiling and racial disparities); United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1278 
(11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (finding that the facts known to the officer in the case 
“support nothing more than impermissible racial profiling that should never be used under our 
Constitution”); Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(“[C]ourts across the country are recognizing claims based on police use of racial profiling.”); 
State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (finding a de facto policy of 
racially profiling minority motorists). 
 32. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 825 (D. Ariz. 2013) (outlining a 
sheriff’s office’s policy of considering race as one factor during “immigration enforcement 
operations”), adhered to by No. CV–07–02513–PHX–GMS, 2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 
2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 
427 (Ariz. 1975) (discussing how race can be the “basis for an officer’s initial suspicion,” and 
outlining an instance in which a man was arrested after an investigation in which his race was 
considered); Bennett L. Gershman, Use of Race in “Stop-and-Frisk”: Stereotypical Beliefs 
Linger, But How Far Can the Police Go?, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., March/April 2000, at 42, 42–
43 (outlining how race has been used by police); German Lopez, Police Officers Explain How 
They’re Encouraged to Act in Racist Ways, VOX (July 8, 2016, 12:10 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/7/8/12128858/police-racism-officers-admit [https://perma.cc/3VVX-
9ABH] (discussing an interview in which police admitted to targeting “vulnerable communities,” 
such as people of color).  
 33. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
AND FAIRNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 23–24, 28 (2016) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON PANEL] 
(describing how the statistics reveal bias and racial disparities in searches, stops, and arrests). 
Studies show that law enforcement officers hold many of the same biases as the general public, 
and in implicit bias tests, patterns are nearly universal. See Megan Quattlebaum, Let’s Get Real: 
Behavioral Realism, Implicit Bias, and the Reasonable Police Officer, 14 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 1, 
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law enforcement officers explicitly used race when compiling profiles of 
drug couriers.34 In the early twenty-first century, law enforcement began 
using race as a factor in terrorism investigations.35 
Big data policing has ushered in an entirely new phase of the use of 
race in the criminal justice system. Police, prosecutors, and judges across 
the country are using predictive algorithms to determine where to allocate 
law enforcement resources, whether to set bail, and how long to sentence 
a defendant after conviction.36 Although these algorithms may increase 
the efficiency and the accuracy of the system, they have also been 
 
12, 13 n.41 (2018). Black people (especially Black men) are more often associated with or quickly 
paired with being threatening, and this tends to hold true regardless of the race or ethnicity of the 
person taking the test. See id. at 12 & n.39. As a result, “Black and Hispanic people are more 
likely to be searched without consent than any other group, and, of those searched, Black and 
Hispanic people had the lowest ‘hit rates.’” BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra, at 23; see also COMM. 
ON PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON CRIME, CMTYS. & C.L. & COMM. ON L. & JUST., NAT’L 
ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., PROACTIVE POLICING 251 (David Weisburd & Malay K. 
Majmundar eds., 2018) (“The high rates at which non-Whites are stopped, questioned, cited, 
arrested, or injured by the police present some of the most salient criminal justice policy 
phenomena in the United States.”); C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 4 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3ZJ 
-88K6] (“African Americans are more than twice as likely as white drivers to be searched during 
vehicle stops even after controlling for non-race based variables such as the reason the vehicle 
stop was initiated, but are found in possession of contraband 26% less often than white drivers, 
suggesting officers are impermissibly considering race as a factor when determining whether to 
search.”); ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE 
PUBLIC, 2015, at 4 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DET4-2DVH] (“Blacks were more likely to be pulled over in traffic stops than whites and 
Hispanics.”); Clarence Edwards, Race and the Police, NAT’L POLICE FOUND., https://www.police 
foundation.org/race-and-the-police/ [https://perma.cc/59VL-PEF3] (discussing “the role implicit 
and overt biases have historically played in creating disparate law enforcement practices and the 
resulting frictions between African Americans and the police”). 
A related issue which is beyond the scope of this Article is that police officers are about three 
and a half times more likely to use lethal force against unarmed Blacks than against unarmed 
whites. See Cody T. Ross, A Multi-Level Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police Shootings at 
the County-Level in the United States, 2011–2014, PLOS ONE (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0141854 [https://perma.cc/ 
9UTA-VKZG] (“Racial bias in police shootings in the United States has been widely noted in the 
sociological literature for many decades. Explanations range from implicit bias in the psychology 
of individual officers . . . the issue of ‘minority threat’ . . . [and] racial bias in profiling and 
encountering suspects . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).  
 34. See infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-
science.html [https://perma.cc/AJB7-7K66]; Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 196, 202–05 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. 
Reitz eds., 2012); Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Risk Assessment Tools, ELEC. PRIV. 
INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/ [https://perma.cc/7MB7-8CF6]. 
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criticized for exacerbating, or at least reinforcing, the existing racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system.37 While none of the predictive 
algorithms used by police and courts explicitly take race into account, 
many rely on data such as prior arrests or convictions in predicting future 
criminal activity.38 But this underlying data is tainted because racial 
minorities have disproportionate contact with the criminal justice system 
and because of established biases in policing and prosecuting.39 This 
means, of course, that the current predictive algorithms are merely the 
newest manifestation of an age-old problem that discriminates against 
non-white individuals. For decades, law enforcement officers have used 
race or factors correlated with race in making decisions about where to 
patrol, whom to investigate, and whom to arrest. Much of the time, police 
officers and courts have used race as a factor for the simplest and basest 
of reasons: to reinforce the subjugation of certain ethnic groups. But in at 
least some contexts, police officers and courts used race as a factor 
because they believed—rightly or wrongly—that it would help them 
make more accurate predictions about criminal behavior.  
The rise of big data in the criminal justice system also helps to frame 
the question of race in the criminal justice system in the simplest of terms. 
Consider a thought experiment—one which could easily become reality 
sometime in the next decade. Assume that a company has developed an 
algorithm that can predict with great accuracy whether illegal drugs will 
be found inside a house. The algorithm requires the user to enter six 
different inputs, including the address where the house is located, any 
prior criminal convictions of the house’s owner, and specific observations 
of police officers about activity outside the house. The algorithm also 
allows a user to input a seventh factor: the race of the house’s owner. The 
algorithm has been tested on over a million cases, and the empirical 
evidence shows that without using the race factor, the algorithm is correct 
40% of the time when it predicts the presence of drugs inside the house. 
If the algorithm uses race as a factor, its accuracy increases to 60%. The 
police have purchased this algorithm and they intend to use it during 
investigations and include its results in their search warrant applications. 
Should the courts permit the police to use race as a factor when operating 
the algorithm? If not, why not? If so, under what conditions? 
 
 37. See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 47 (2017) 
(“[M]any of the variables [considered by criminal justice algorithms] directly correlate with 
racially discriminatory law enforcement practices.”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for 
Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G. REP. 237, 237 (2015) (“[R]isk today has 
collapsed into prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Dewan, supra note 36. 
 39. See Harcourt, supra note 37, at 240. For example, although whites and Blacks use 
marijuana at the same rates, Blacks are 3.73 times more likely than whites to be arrested for 
marijuana possession. FERGUSON, supra note 37, at 48. 
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As noted in the introduction, the two constitutional provisions that 
regulate the use of race in criminal investigations are the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Parts II and III examine the 
different ways courts have applied each of these provisions. 
II.  REGULATING THE USE OF RACE PART I: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT QUESTION 
For Fourth Amendment purposes, law enforcement investigations can 
be divided into two stages. The first is the “pre-contact” stage, in which 
police officers make decisions about whom they should investigate but 
do not engage with a suspect in any way that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment. The second is the “contact” stage, for which the Fourth 
Amendment regulates the degree to which the officer can interact with 
the suspect and requires the officer to cite specific factors to justify the 
length and severity of the interaction.  
The pre-contact stage includes deciding where and to what extent to 
allocate investigative resources and personnel and also when to engage 
in surveillance in public areas.40 Contrary to its name, the pre-contact 
stage also includes some situations in which the police interact with a 
suspect, as long as the interaction does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.41 For example, police may approach an individual to engage 
in a consensual conversation or ask a motorist for consent to search their 
car after a lawful, non-discriminatory stop. Since none of this behavior is 
regulated by the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit using race as a factor, even if it is the only factor, in the pre-
contact stage of an investigation.42  
Using race during the pre-contact stage often leads to discriminatory 
effects, since pre-contact decisions frequently evolve into contact 
situations like a Terry stop, a traffic stop, or an arrest. Thus, the use of 
 
 40. United States v. Travis, 837 F. Supp. 1386, 1391 (E.D. Ky. 1993), aff’d, 62 F.3d 170 
(6th Cir. 1995). 
 41. See United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 353 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (finding 
that, when police approached the defendant outside the airport and asked to interview him and to 
search his bag, the initial encounter was consensual and thus “it is unnecessary to consider or 
decide . . . the specific factual question of whether the officers’ surveillance of Taylor was 
motivated to any degree by his race”); United States v. Jennings, 985 F.2d 562, 1993 WL 5927, 
at *3 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) (describing how the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated when a consensual interview takes place); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 
(1983) (stating that a consensual conversation between an officer and a defendant in a public place 
is not alone sufficient to categorize the transaction as a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes); 
United States v. Flowers, 909 F.2d 145, 147 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (finding a person’s 
voluntary consent to a search of their belongings does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Collis, 766 F.2d 219, 221 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (finding that 
an officer’s quest for voluntary information is not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment). 
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race in the pre-contact stage will often result in a disproportionate number 
of Blacks or Hispanics being stopped, arrested, and even prosecuted. 
For example, in United States v. Williams,43 the police used a drug 
courier profile which focused on travelers who were “(1) young African–
American males; (2) arriving into Cleveland from Detroit; (3) using the 
Greyhound bus system; (4) arriving in the late evening or early morning 
hours; (5) carrying no luggage; and (6) not met by family members or 
acquaintances.”44 Given the innocent and relatively common occurrence 
of factors two through six, the dissent noted that this “profile” essentially 
meant that the police could follow any young, Black males who got off 
the bus at the Greyhound station.45 In the Williams case itself, the police 
followed the two defendants for a period of time, and when the 
defendants saw the officers, the defendants fled and tried to dispose of a 
bag, which appeared to contain crack cocaine.46 The officers then arrested 
the defendants based on the flight and their attempted disposal of the 
bag.47 By the time the police took action, they had race-neutral reasons 
for making contact: the flight and attempted disposal of the bag. 
However, had the police not first identified the defendants using race 
during the pre-contact stage, the defendants would never have been 
surveilled and followed, and thus never would have been arrested. 
Once law enforcement officers make “contact” with a suspect, often 
through a Terry stop, a traffic stop, or by targeting the suspect with a 
search or arrest warrant, the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions come into 
play. The Fourth Amendment ensures that police conduct is 
“reasonable”—which usually means that law enforcement officers have 
demonstrated a sufficient level of individualized suspicion48 to justify the 
search or seizure they are engaging in.49 The Fourth Amendment analysis 
of whether law enforcement officers can use race as a factor at this stage 
requires answering an empirical question: Does the suspect’s race 
increase the chance that he is engaging in criminal activity? If so, then the 
 
 43. 949 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 44. Id. at 222 (Jones, J., dissenting). The issue of the Equal Protection Clause was only 
raised by a dissenting judge after a remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. Like many 
Fourth Amendment cases involving the use of race in criminal investigations, the Williams 
majority did not even discuss the Equal Protection Clause in its Fourth Amendment analysis, 
although it did discuss the Equal Protection Clause when discussing a sentencing issue. See United 
States v. Williams, 916 F.2d 714, 1990 WL 159153, at *1, *4 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision), vacated, 500 U.S. 901 (1991). 
 45. Williams, 949 F.2d at 222–23 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
 46.  Id. at 221. 
 47. Id. at 222–23 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
 48. This Article will use the term “individualized suspicion” as a shorthand to refer to either 
reasonable suspicion (the level of individualized suspicion necessary for a Terry stop or a traffic 
stop) or probable cause (the level of individualized suspicion necessary for a search warrant or an 
arrest).  
 49. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
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use of race in that context would be an acceptable factor under the Fourth 
Amendment.50 Whether the factor in question is related to an immutable 
characteristic or a suspect class, such as race or religion, is irrelevant. As 
one court noted: “[T]he Fourth Amendment—unlike the Equal Protection 
Clause—imposes no a priori restriction on race-based governmental 
action.”51 
Although the Fourth Amendment does not bar the use of race as a 
factor for determining individualized suspicion, race is an irrelevant and 
thus illegitimate factor, unless the law enforcement officer can 
demonstrate a correlation between the suspect’s race and the likelihood 
that the suspect is engaging in criminal activity. Historically, courts have 
allowed law enforcement officers to testify that particular factors increase 
the probability of criminal activity, even when officers base their 
testimony on subjective opinions supported by personal past experiences 
and unsupported by quantifiable evidence.52 Judges then evaluate the 
 
 50. See Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 51. Id. at 461; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he 
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But 
the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the 
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 
Some commentators have disagreed, arguing that singling out specific groups should be 
considered “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. For example, Professor Anthony C. 
Thompson notes that “one of the primary concerns of the framers was that the state should not 
exercise its search powers against those who are not members of the established majority,” and 
that the Fourth Amendment was drafted in part to ensure that less-enfranchised individuals, such 
as Quakers, would not be subject to disparate treatment. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the 
Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 991, 996 (1999); see 
also Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and 
the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 932 (2015) 
(arguing that the values of the Fourteenth Amendment inform what is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment); Richard M. Re, Fourth Amendment Fairness, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1409, 1435–36 
(2018) (arguing that individualized suspicion cannot be based on generalized views of a racial 
group). However, the modern Supreme Court has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment in this 
way. 
 52. See, e.g., Seth Stoughton, Evidentiary Rulings as Police Reform, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
429, 457–59 (2015) (describing how a police officer’s use of personal experiences may present 
problems when relying on their expert testimony). Professor Stoughton notes that courts often 
allow police officers to use “cop knowledge” of questionable reliability when testifying. Id. at 
458–59. For example, some officers testify that individuals carrying a weapon “tend to be heavy 
on one side.” Id. at 458. One officer relied upon similar cop knowledge when justifying a Terry 
stop when he testified that he could tell the suspect was armed based on the “distinctive way that 
the defendant stepped up onto a curb.” Id. When the judge asked the officer whether he had tested 
this technique, the officer admitted that out of fifty people whom he had stopped based on this 
“distinctive step,” only one was armed. Id.; see also Ana Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of 
Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2025–27 (2017) (tracing the history of how courts 
have relied on police “expertise” when determining whether reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause exists).  
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legitimacy and strength of these factors, often incorporating their own 
subjective beliefs about the strength of the correlation between the factors 
and criminal activity.53 For example, officers may testify that a particular 
encounter occurred in a “high crime area” to help build a case for 
reasonable suspicion, without providing any data to support the assertion 
that the neighborhood experiences more crime than other areas.54 Many 
scholars criticize such anecdotal evidence as being insufficiently precise 
and susceptible to abuse.55 In past decades, the absence of independently 
verifiable data meant that judicial reliance on the officer’s personal 
opinion could be accepted as a necessary evil.56 In the absence of 
empirical data, courts had little on which to rely besides the expertise of 
the police who patrolled the streets daily and therefore had a “feel” for 
identifying potential indications of criminal activity.57 Today, however, 
law enforcement officers and courts should have access to a wide array 
of data that can statistically link specific factors to the presence of 
crime.58 Thus, in the modern era, courts should be more exacting in 
reviewing the factors that law enforcement officers cite when trying to 
 
 53. See Lvovsky, supra note 52, at 2025–26, 2029, 2058–59.  
 54. See, e.g., People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 119–20 (Cal. 1979) (cautioning skepticism 
when a police officer uses “high crime area” as a factor, since this factor is open to abuse by police 
officers and the officer’s own prior arrests in the area may have been improper or not resulted in 
a conviction), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, Proposition 8 (1982) (codified at 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2)). 
 55. Recent empirical studies of the use of “high crime area” as a factor in investigative stops 
confirm that this subjective and imprecise standard is useless in actually predicting whether 
criminal activity is afoot. See Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-
Crime Areas, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 345, 345–46 (2019) (“[W]e find evidence that officers often 
assess whether areas are high crime using a very broad geographic lens; that they call almost every 
block in the city high crime; that their assessments of whether an area is high crime are nearly 
uncorrelated with actual crime rates; that the suspect’s race predicts whether an officer calls an 
area high crime as well as the actual crime rate; that the racial composition of the area and the 
identity of the officer are stronger predictors of whether an officer calls an area high crime than 
the crime rate itself; and that stops are less or as likely to result in the detection of contraband 
when an officer invokes high-crime area as a basis of a stop.”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & 
Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable 
Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1642 
(2008) (recommending that courts demand objective and verifiable empirical evidence proving 
that an area is a high crime area before considering it a valid part of the reasonable suspicion 
analysis). 
 56. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 55, at 1607–09, 1615–16. 
 57. See id. at 1607–08, 1614. 
 58. See, e.g., Grunwald & Fagan, supra note 55, at 353 (noting how devices could inform 
patrol officers when they are in a high crime area based on crime data and departmental policy). 
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establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause, setting standards that 
require actual data rather than anecdotal evidence or subjective beliefs.59 
Whether judges approve of using race as a factor in criminal 
investigations depends not only on the type of data that law enforcement 
present, but also law enforcement’s underlying theory as to why race is 
relevant to criminal activity in any given case. Law enforcement officers 
usually rely on one of three theories: the suspect’s race was part of an 
eyewitness identification; the suspect’s race is an “incongruency” that 
creates or contributes to reasonable suspicion; or members of a particular 
race are more likely to commit a particular type of crime, often as part of 
a criminal profile used by the police.60 This Article considers each of 
these theories in turn. 
A.  Eyewitness Identification by Race 
Law enforcement officers use race as a factor when searching for a 
suspect when eyewitnesses include race as part of the description of a 
perpetrator.61 This use of race has generally been uncontroversial because 
it treats race no differently from other identifying characteristics, such as 
height or hair color.62 However, because race is such an easily identifiable 
 
 59. Some commentators have argued that implicit bias makes it very difficult for judges to 
be accurate in using race as a predictor. See, e.g., Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal 
Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 
1408, 1420, 1434–35 (1979) (“[D]ecisionmakers may be influenced by negative views about 
minority racial groups to make negative predictions even when the predictive power of race is 
nonexistent.”). 
 60. This taxonomy is adapted from Professor Sheri Johnson’s article. See Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 225–26, 233 (1983). 
Professor Johnson creates another category of “illegal aliens,” and concludes that the Fourth 
Amendment allows using race as a factor when law enforcement officers attempt to detect illegal 
immigration by using race as a factor. Id. at 230–33. As noted below, the Author believes 
Professor Johnson is incorrect in carving out a separate category for the crime of illegal 
immigration. See infra note 91. 
 Professors Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston include another category: “Underworld 
Segregation,” based on the premise that certain criminal organizations are comprised almost 
exclusively of a certain ethnicity. Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Essay, Racial Profiling 
Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1433 (2002). This is a relatively rare situation, and when 
it does occur, the practice fits into the criminal profile category, since it is simply another way of 
arguing that individuals of a certain ethnicity are more likely to commit a given crime.  
 61. Johnson, supra note 60, at 225–26; see, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 
337 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that plaintiffs were questioned because a crime victim identified the 
perpetrators by race, gender, and age); People v. Johnson, 478 N.Y.S.2d 987, 992–93 (App. Div. 
1984) (“Where a suspect has been described by his race, it is ‘a characteristic which may properly 
be used as one element of identification.’” (quoting Franklin v. State, 374 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1979))).  
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[R]ace or ethnic 
background may become a legitimate consideration when investigators have information on this 
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characteristic, and because of pre-existing prejudices against particular 
ethnic groups, the use of race as an identifying factor is subject to abuse 
even in this seemingly straightforward context. The most infamous 
modern-day example of this abuse is Brown v. City of Oneonta.63 In 
Brown, police obtained a description from an assault victim that the 
perpetrator was a young Black man who had a cut on his hand from the 
attack.64 After a canine unit tracked the perpetrator’s scent in the direction 
of a nearby college campus, the police obtained a list of every Black male 
student on campus.65 They then attempted to question every student on 
the list.66 When that tactic failed to find the perpetrator, the police 
patrolled the town of Oneonta for the next few days, stopping every non-
white person they encountered on the street and inspecting their hands for 
cuts.67 The individuals on the list of students and many of the individuals 
who were stopped on the street later brought a § 1983 class action lawsuit, 
alleging in part that the police violated their rights under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.68 
Oneonta is a striking example of how using race as an identifying 
factor can lead to discriminatory harassment, even when there is an 
established link between the race of the suspect and the perpetrator of the 
crime.69 In addition, Oneonta’s unusual fact pattern provides the first 
useful case study in examining the legal interaction between race and 
individualized suspicion. Some of the initial police activity did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment at all.70 Obtaining a list of Black 
 
subject about a particular suspect.”); see also Gross & Livingston, supra note 60, at 1415 (“It is 
not racial profiling for an officer to question, stop, search, arrest, or otherwise investigate a person 
because his race or ethnicity matches information about a perpetrator of a specific crime that the 
officer is investigating. That use of race—which usually occurs when there is a racially specific 
description of the criminal—does not entail a global judgment about a racial or ethnic group as a 
whole.”). Of course, eyewitnesses’ identifications, particularly those involving cross-racial 
identifications, are often mistaken. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The 
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification.”). Publicizing the perceived race of a suspect in a serious 
crime can add to racial tensions and confirm negative racial stereotypes. But these factors are not 
relevant to the question of whether race can be used as an identifying characteristic when 
searching for a suspect. 
 63. 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 64. Id. at 334. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Or perhaps one should say a “claimed link” between the race of the suspect and the 
perpetrator of the crime, since eyewitnesses can be mistaken. See supra note 62. 
 70. The Fourth Amendment aspect of the Oneonta court’s decision was focused on whether 
the various encounters that the police had with the plaintiffs rose to the level of Terry stops—the 
court concluded that some of them did and some of them did not, and then remanded the case to 
the lower court for further analysis on those that did. Oneonta, 221 F.3d at 340–41. 
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students, for example, is a pre-contact action that falls outside the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment.71 Likewise, any consensual encounters that 
the police had with Black students or residents during the days following 
the crime are unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.72 But some of the 
police officer’s later actions were subject to the Fourth Amendment: 
specifically, the forcible, non-consensual stops of non-white residents to 
inspect their hands.73 Given the fact that the victim had identified the 
perpetrator as Black, it was appropriate to use race as one of the factors 
in determining whom to stop, and the individual’s race, perhaps when 
combined with other factors, would contribute to a legitimate finding of 
reasonable suspicion. But in conducting their investigation, the police 
used race as the only factor in determining whom to stop. Although the 
appellate court never reached the question in Oneonta, the plaintiffs’ race 
was almost certainly insufficient on its own to rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion.74  
Oneonta also provides a first example of how courts can misconstrue 
statistical data when determining whether and how race should be used 
in a Fourth Amendment analysis. The Oneonta court stated that the town 
where the police investigation took place had 10,000 total residents, and 
that “[f]ewer than three hundred” were Black.75 Likewise, the court noted 
that 7,500 students attended the local college, and that “just two percent” 
 
 71. Whether obtaining a list of Black students should trigger the Equal Protection Clause is 
a question for Part III. 
 72. See id.  
 73. See id.  
 74. This Article demonstrates that some courts, including the Supreme Court, have held that 
race on its own can never be sufficient to generate reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (1975) (concluding that the “apparent Mexican 
ancestry” of a car’s occupants did not “furnish[] reasonable grounds to believe that 
the . . . occupants were aliens”); United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
fact that one is of Mexican national origin does not create reasonable suspicion that one is an 
illegal alien, since, in border areas, there are far more legal citizens than illegal aliens of Mexican 
national origin.”); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In short, the 
agents in this case saw a Hispanic man cautiously and attentively driving a 16 year-old Ford with 
a worn suspension, who glanced in his rear view mirror while being followed by agents in a 
marked Border Patrol car. This profile could certainly fit hundreds or thousands of law-abiding 
daily users of the highways of Southern California.”), amended by 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1993). 
But this is certainly not true in every context. If a victim identified her assailant as white, and the 
pool of possible suspects has only one white person in it, the police may be able to establish 
reasonable suspicion for a stop or even probable cause for an arrest based solely on the person’s 
race. Indeed, as the “racial incongruity” argument below shows, law enforcement officers have 
occasionally testified that individuals of a certain race in a certain neighborhood are nearly certain 
to be involved in criminal activity. See, e.g., People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 117 (Cal. 1979), 
superseded in part by constitutional amendment, Proposition 8 (1982) (codified at CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 28(f)(2)); infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 75. 221 F.3d at 334. 
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of them were Black.76 Focusing on these numbers implies that the 
important question for Fourth Amendment purposes is the ratio of Black 
residents to all residents—in other words, that the fact that 3% of the 
town’s residents and 2% of the college students are Black is relevant to 
the Fourth Amendment analysis. In reality, however, the denominator of 
that equation—the number of total residents—is completely irrelevant. 
For Fourth Amendment analysis, all that matters is the number of 
individuals in the suspect pool who share the characteristic described by 
the victim—in this case, the number of residents or students who were 
Black. For example, assume the police knew that the perpetrator was 
Black and were somehow certain that he was a student at the college. 
Since there were 150 Black students at the college, the victim’s 
description would mean that for any given Black student at the college, 
there was a 1 in 150 chance that the suspect was guilty. Although courts 
have been reluctant to attach any specific percentage to the concept of 
reasonable suspicion, 1 in 150 is certainly too low.77 This would be true 
whether the 150 Black students at the school were 2% of the total student 
body, or whether they were 98% of the total student body. Conversely, 
assume that the police were certain that the perpetrator was Black and 
was a student at the college, and the total student body had only 100 
students, only two of whom were Black. In that case, even though Black 
students made up only 2% of the student body, there was a 1 in 2 chance 
that either of the Black students was guilty—certainly a great enough 
chance to create reasonable suspicion. In other words, what is important 
is not the percentage of the entire suspect pool that matches the racial 
description, but rather the chance that any one of the individuals who 
matches the racial description is guilty. As noted below, courts in 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. The Supreme Court has been outwardly hostile to any attempts to quantify the level of 
suspicion that constitutes reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989) (stating that the lower court’s attempt “to refine and elaborate 
the requirements of ‘reasonable suspicion’ . . . create[d] unnecessary difficulty”); Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise 
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on 
the totality of the circumstances.”). However, a 1982 survey of judges revealed that, on average, 
they equated reasonable suspicion to a 29.59% likelihood that criminal activity was occurring, 
and they equated probable cause to a 44.52% likelihood that criminal activity was occurring. See 
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1332 tbl.8 (1982). Recently, I conducted my own survey 
of federal magistrates and calculated similar numbers: On average, magistrates equated 
reasonable suspicion to a 35.4% chance that criminal activity was occurring, and they equated 
probable cause to approximately a 52% chance that criminal activity was occurring. See RIC 
SIMMONS, SMART SURVEILLANCE: HOW TO INTERPRET THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 75–77 (2019). 
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profiling and immigration cases engage in a similar, but more severe, 
mistake in their probability analysis.78  
B.  Race as an “Incongruity” 
The second way that law enforcement officers use race as a factor in 
generating individualized suspicion is when a person’s race is 
incongruous in a certain geographic location, and the incongruity 
allegedly implies criminal activity.79 In 1973, an appellate court in 
Arizona upheld the Terry stop of a Latino suspect, solely because the 
officer testified that “it was very unusual to see a person of either ‘white’ 
or Mexican descent in this particular area, and that it had been their 
experience in the past that the few ‘whites’ or Mexicans who were in the 
area were there for the purpose of purchasing narcotics.”80 In State v. 
Dean,81 the arresting officer never even specified how the defendant’s 
racial incongruity was linked to a specific type of crime but merely stated 
that the suspect was “a Mexican male in a predominantly white 
neighborhood of—oh, middle to upper-middle class people.”82 
Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme Court approved the Terry stop, 
holding that “the fact that a person is obviously out of place in a particular 
neighborhood is one of several factors that may be considered by an 
 
 78. See infra notes 111–151 and accompanying text.  
 79. Johnson, supra note 60, at 226–30; see also Gross & Livingston, supra note 60, at 1432–
33 (rejecting racial incongruity as a basis for suspicion on policy grounds because it could 
reinforce racial segregation) (“[A]rresting occasional drug users and retail dealers is not a 
sufficient benefit to justify stopping and searching people who cross common lines of residential 
and social segregation, even if the factual premise is correct.”). 
The theory of racial incongruity has its own dark history, including countless examples of 
white people calling the police because a Black person seems “suspicious” in a majority-White 
neighborhood. A recent, tragic example of this phenomenon was the killing of Ahmaud Arbery 
in Georgia. Although the two white individuals who attacked Arbery claimed that they confronted 
him because they saw him trespassing on a nearby construction site, it is likely that their 
suspicions of Arbery were enhanced because they believed that as a Black man he seemed “out 
of place” in their majority-white neighborhood. See Nicquel Terry Ellis, What We Know About 
Community Where Ahmaud Arbery Was Shot: 911 Caller Reported ‘Black Guy’ on Property, 
USA TODAY (May 9, 2020, 7:29 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/2020/05/08/ahmaud-
arbery-shooting-what-we-know-satilla-shores-community/3096389001/ [https://perma.cc/6QYV 
-YN]. 
 80. State v. Ruiz, 504 P.2d 1307, 1307 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). The officer testified that 
“West Buckeye Road is mainly a Negro district and any Mexicans or white people in the area are 
suspicious.” Id. at 1308. The court’s Terry analysis consists of simply adopting the officer’s 
conclusions: “[T]he evidence reveals that here the police officers observed defendant in an 
unusual situation which, in light of their experience, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion on their 
part that criminal activity might be afoot.” Id. at 1309. 
 81. 543 P.2d 425 (Ariz. 1975). 
 82. Id. at 427. 
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officer and the court in determining whether an investigation and 
detention is reasonable and therefore lawful.”83  
Other courts have been more skeptical of using racial incongruity as a 
factor in criminal investigations. For example, in People v. Bower,84 the 
police officer testified that he observed the white defendant in a 
“‘predominantly black’ area” at night, and this was a factor in generating 
reasonable suspicion because, in three and a half years in patrolling the 
area, he had “never observed a white person in the projects . . . in the 
hours of darkness . . . for [an] innocent purpose.”85 The officer supported 
this assertion by testifying that during his career he had encountered 
twenty-six white individuals in the area at night who were there to 
purchase narcotics, and that every other white person he encountered 
there at night was a robbery victim.86 Assuming the police officer’s 
testimony was credible, this would mean that based on this limited data 
set, the fact that the person was white was directly correlated with the 
presence of illegal activity—that is, a white person in that neighborhood 
had a 100% likelihood of being either a criminal or a crime victim. Thus, 
under standard Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the defendant’s status 
as a white man should have been a legitimate factor in determining 
reasonable suspicion. But the California Supreme Court disagreed: 
[T]he fact that appellant was a white man could raise no 
reasonable suspicion of crime. A person’s racial status is not 
an “unusual” circumstance and the presence of an individual 
of one race in an area inhabited primarily by members of 
another race is not a sufficient basis to suggest that crime is 
afoot.87  
 
 83. Id. The court noted that there were other factors that also gave rise to reasonable 
suspicion, such as the suspect’s nervous behavior and “[t]he location of the parked car in front of 
the apartment complex, [and] its close proximity to three different roads if the driver were required 
to leave in a hurry.” Id. at 426. But it explicitly approved of the use of racial incongruity: “That a 
person is observed in a neighborhood not frequented by persons of his ethnic background is quite 
often a basis for an officer’s initial suspicion. To attempt by judicial fiat to say he may not do this 
ignores the practical aspects of good law enforcement.” Id. at 427.  In United States v. Richard, 
the court implied that racial incongruity could be a factor establishing probable cause for a warrant 
but was not sufficient to establish probable cause on its own: “[T]he presence of two black males 
cruising in a car in a predominately white neighborhood is, by itself, insufficient cause for a belief 
that those persons have participated in a recent crime in the neighborhood.” 535 F.2d 246, 248 
(3d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). 
 84. 597 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1979), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, Proposition 
8 (1982) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2)). 
 85. Id. at 117.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 119.  
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There is really no way to reconcile Dean and Bower.88 In Dean, the 
court approved of using racial incongruity as a factor even though there 
was no evidence on the record to link racial incongruity to a specific 
crime. In Bower, the officer provided substantial evidence that racial 
incongruity was strongly correlated with one of two specific crimes, and 
the court rejected the use of the factor. On one level, this inconsistency 
reflects the familiarly subjective aspect of determining reasonable 
suspicion; on another level, it indicates the challenges that courts face 
when discussing issues of race in the criminal justice system. The Bower 
court was explicit about these challenges, noting that: “Freedom to travel 
and to associate are fundamental rights in this state, and the suggestion 
that their exercise can contribute to a lawful seizure of one’s person under 
these circumstances is both illogical and intolerable.”89 It is certainly 
reasonable to hold that it is intolerable for police to target an individual 
in part because he chooses to associate with a person of a different race—
but that is a question for the Equal Protection analysis. Whether using this 
factor is illogical is merely a question of data, and the data the police 
officer gave to the Bower court indicated that it was perfectly logical to 
use this factor to make an inference of criminal activity.90 
C.  Race as an Indicator of Criminal Behavior 
The final way in which race could be a relevant factor in determining 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is if individuals of a specific racial 
background tend to commit a specific crime more often than individuals 
who are not members of that race.91 There is ample evidence that many 
 
 88. At least there is no legally principled way to reconcile the two. It is hard to avoid the 
observation that in Dean, a court approved of using racial incongruity when the police used it as 
a factor to stop a Hispanic suspect, see 543 P.2d at 427, while in Bower, a court rejected the use 
of racial incongruity when the police used it as a factor to stop a white suspect, see 597 P.2d at 
119. 
 89. 597 P.2d at 119. 
 90. Admittedly, the “data” the Bower officer provided (one officer’s set of observations 
over a three-and-a-half-year period) might have been exaggerated or suspect. See id. at 117. 
However, it was sworn testimony from a witness at the suppression hearing, and the record shows 
no sign that the defense presented any countervailing evidence. See id. at 117–18, 122. It is 
certainly more reliable than the oft-used “high crime area” testimony that officers use to enhance 
their reasonable suspicion. 
 91. Johnson, supra note 60, at 236–37. Johnson has a different category for race as a factor 
in a profile or race as indicating a higher likelihood of committing a specific crime, but for this 
Article’s purposes these two categories are the same. See id. at 233–36; see also Gross & 
Livingston, supra note 60, at 1415 (“‘[R]acial profiling’ occurs whenever a law enforcement 
officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer 
believes that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population 
at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating.”). 
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police officers, motivated by explicit or implicit bias, believe that race 
can be an indicator of criminality.92 As a 2018 federal commission on 
police practices noted:  
Studies show that law enforcement officers hold many of the 
same biases as the general public, and in implicit bias tests, 
patterns are nearly universal. Black people (especially black 
men) are more often associated or quickly paired with being 
“threatening,” and this tends to hold true regardless of the 
race or ethnicity of the person taking the test.93 
Former FBI Director James Comey put the issue more bluntly:  
A mental shortcut becomes almost irresistible and maybe 
even rational by some lights. The two young black men on 
one side of the street look like so many others the officer has 
locked up. Two white men on the other side of the same 
street—even in the same clothes—do not. The officer does 
not make the same association about the two white guys, 
whether that officer is white or black. And that drives 
different behavior.94 
This explicit or implicit bias explains some, if not most, of the higher 
rates of stops and arrests against Black and Hispanic individuals.95 
 
Many courts and commentators categorize this relationship as claiming that individuals of a 
certain race have a “propensity” to commit a certain type of crime. See, e.g., Farag v. United 
States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). This Article avoids the term “propensity,” 
since it implies a tendency in a person’s character or personality to act a certain way. All that is 
relevant under the Fourth Amendment analysis is whether there is a statistical correlation between 
a person’s race and certain types of criminal activity; the cause of that correlation is immaterial.  
 92. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Whitman Dismisses State Police Chief for Race 
Remarks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/01/nyregion/whitman-
dismisses-state-police-chief-for-race-remarks.html [https://perma.cc/SP8H-JAEW]. McFadden 
quotes the then-superintendent of the New Jersey State Police:  
Today, with this drug problem, the drug problem is cocaine or marijuana. It is 
most likely a minority group that’s involved with that.  
 . . . . 
 . . . If you’re looking at the methamphetamine market, that seems to be 
controlled by the motorcycle gangs, which are basically white . . . . If you are 
looking at heroin and stuff like that, your involvement there is more or less 
Jamaican. 
Id. (quotation marks omitted). The governor fired the superintendent after he made these 
comments. 
 93. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., POLICE USE OF FORCE 103 (2018), https://www.usccr.gov/ 
pubs/2018/11-15-Police-Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4W-7685].  
 94. Id. (quoting James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Hard Truths: Law 
Enforcement and Race, Remarks at Georgetown University (Feb. 12, 2015)). 
 95. See supra note 33. 
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Obviously, race should not contribute to individualized suspicion if its 
link to criminal behavior is based solely on a police officer’s explicit or 
implicit bias. However, there are contexts in which the state has argued 
that race can be a legitimate factor in criminal investigations. In some 
cases, the suspect’s race could be part of a specific profile based on data 
describing individuals who are likely to commit a certain crime.96 For 
example, police routinely use “drug courier” profiles when deciding 
whom to stop and question in an airport, and those profiles may include 
the race of the subject.97 For example, in United States v. Weaver,98 a 
Drug Enforcement Agent seized the defendant’s bags at the airport 
because the defendant fit a specific profile: he was a “roughly dressed” 
young Black man; he was walking rapidly; he did not have identification 
on him; and he appeared unusually nervous when talking to law 
enforcement.99 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
approved of using the defendant’s race as one of the factors, since the 
 
 96. See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection 
Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1081 n.17 (2001). In a sense, the “incongruity” 
reasoning could be considered a subcategory of the “profile” reasoning, with incongruity being 
one of a number of factors used in a profile. The practice of using race as part of a broader profile 
for detecting terrorists found strong support in the mainstream media in the weeks following the 
September 11th attacks. See Gross & Livingstone, supra note 60, at 1414 n.3 (collecting sources); 
Stanley Crouch, Editorial, Drawing the Line on Racial Profiling, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 4, 2001, 
at 41 (arguing that African American profiling is different from profiling Arab Americans after 
the September 11th attacks); Michael Kinsley, When Is Racial Profiling Okay?, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 30, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2001/09/30/when-is-
racial-profiling-okay/4fdb1630-d0b1-4810-aa11-8237c5bbbafc/ [https://perma.cc/Y8LS-D36G] 
(suggesting that racial profiling at airport checkpoints may be justifiable); Editorial, Profiling 
Debate Resumes, DENVER POST, Oct. 3, 2001, at B6 (suggesting that race should be taken into 
account in finding law enforcement targets); Dorothy Rabinowitz, Hijacking History, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 7, 2001, at A18 (arguing that Arab American profiling is different from interning Japanese 
Americans during World War II); Stephen J. Singer, Racial Profiling Also Has a Good Side, 
NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 2001, at A38 (arguing that using race, in conjunction with other factors, to 
identify fruitful targets of investigation is not necessarily racist). There is also ample evidence 
that law enforcement officers engaged in racial profiling by aggressively targeting individuals of 
Middle Eastern descent. See Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 
856–68 (2013). 
 97. As one group of dissenting judges put it, “the DEA has all but reduced to writing a 
practice of singling out African-Americans for drug courier inquiries.” United States v. Taylor, 
956 F.2d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Keith, J., dissenting); see Johnson, supra note 60, at 
234 (“Although the DEA has refused to commit the entire [drug courier] profile to writing, the 
profile clearly contains a racial component.”); Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the 
Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. 
REV. 843, 844–55 (1985) (discussing the history and use of drug profiles). 
 98. 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 99. Id. at 392–93; see also United States v. Condelee, 915 F.2d 1206, 1210 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that when law enforcement agents had information that gangs used “sharply dressed black 
female couriers,” the agents could permissibly use the suspect’s race as a factor in generating 
reasonable suspicion). 
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officer testified that “black street gangs from Los Angeles” were 
“notorious for transporting cocaine . . . from Los Angeles for sale.”100 
The majority cautioned that “large groups of our citizens should not be 
regarded by law enforcement officers as presumptively criminal based 
upon their race,” but then it held: 
As it is, however, facts are not to be ignored simply because 
they may be unpleasant—and the unpleasant fact in this case 
is that Hicks had knowledge, based upon his own experience 
and upon the intelligence reports he had received from the 
Los Angeles authorities, that young male members of black 
Los Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with 
cocaine. To that extent, then, race, when coupled with the 
other factors Hicks relied upon, was a factor in the decision 
to approach and ultimately detain Weaver. We wish it were 
otherwise, but we take the facts as they are presented to us, 
not as we would like them to be.101 
In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, law 
enforcement officers began to cite a suspect’s “Middle Eastern descent” 
as a relevant factor in generating individualized suspicion for terrorism. 
Courts responded inconsistently to this tactic. In United States v. 
Ramos,102 a transit authority inspector observed a van in a parking lot 
next to a subway and bus line terminal.103 She noted a number of facts 
that raised her suspicions: the van was parked in the farthest corner of the 
lot; the driver was sitting in the parked van for over twenty minutes; the 
van had a paper temporary out-of-state tag over its regular license plate; 
and the van’s occupants appeared to be of “Middle Eastern descent.”104 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved of the use of 
Middle Eastern descent as a factor, since a recent terrorist bombing at a 
Madrid transit station had been carried out by individuals of Middle 
Eastern descent, and that attack had apparently been coordinated by 
 
 100. Weaver, 966 F.2d at 392, 394 n.2. 
 101. Id. at 394 n.2. The dissent found this aspect of the case troubling because using race as 
a factor “reinforces the kind of stereotyping that lies behind drug-courier profiles.” Id. at 397 
(Arnold, C.J., dissenting). But even the dissent agreed that “[i]f, for example, [the court] had 
evidence that young blacks in Los Angeles were more prone to drug offenses than young whites, 
the fact that a young person is black might be of some significance, though even then it would be 
dangerous to give it much weight.” Id.; see also Castaneda v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 82, 83 
(Va. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc) (approving the use of a drug courier profile which included the fact 
that the drug couriers on this route were “frequently Hispanic or black”). But see Whitfield v. Bd. 
of Cnty. Comm’rs, 837 F. Supp. 338, 340, 343–44 (D. Colo. 1993) (rejecting a drug courier profile 
that relied in part on race). 
 102. 629 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 103. Id. at 62. 
 104. Id. at 62–63. In fact, the driver and all the passengers were Hispanic, but the officers 
involved all believed they were of Middle Eastern descent. See id. at 62 n.2. 
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Osama bin Laden.105 The court concluded: 
While in other situations there may be merit to the argument 
that a description of ethnic appearance is irrelevant and 
nothing more than impermissible profiling, the argument 
fails on the facts here. The MBTA attempted to learn from 
the recent lessons of Madrid and had so trained its 
employees. Not just the recent history of Middle East-
originated terrorism, but also the explicit warnings, issued 
some eleven weeks before, of future strikes by the same 
groups in the United States, meant it was material for the 
officers to consider, among other facts, the risk of terrorist 
attacks on transit stations in major urban centers and that the 
persons they were investigating had a Middle Eastern 
appearance.106 
Conversely, in Farag v. United States,107 two counterterrorism agents 
encountered two individuals of Middle Eastern descent while flying on a 
plane from San Diego to New York.108 The agents’ suspicions were 
aroused by the ethnic background of the men when combined with a 
number of other factors, including the fact that they moved seats 
repeatedly during the flight, they spoke loudly in a mixture of Arabic and 
English, and one of them checked his watch at various times.109 The trial 
judge rejected using race as a factor in the individualized suspicion 
analysis, holding that even though “the specter of 9/11 looms large over 
this case,” race is an impermissible factor under the Fourth Amendment 
absent “compelling statistical evidence” linking race to a specific 
criminal activity.110  
 
 105. Id. at 66–67. 
 106. Id. at 67–68. 
 107. 587 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 108. Id. at 442. 
 109. Id. at 449. 
 110. Id. at 467. The court referenced the immigration cases, see discussion infra Section 
II.D., as examples of where such “compelling statistical evidence” existed. Farag, 587 F. Supp. 
2d at 467. Like many other courts which reject the use of race on Fourth Amendment grounds, 
the Farag court also indicated its discomfort with using race as a factor by quoting a passage from 
the Korematsu v. United States dissent that would seem more appropriate under an Equal 
Protection argument: 
All residents of this nation are kin in some way by blood or culture to a foreign 
land. Yet they are primarily and necessarily a part of the new and distinct 
civilization of the United States. They must accordingly be treated at all times as 
the heirs of the American experiment and as entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Farag, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)). A dissenting 
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The Arizona Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in State v. 
Graciano.111 In Graciano, a highway patrol officer pulled over a “dark-
skinned” young man whom he believed was of “Mexican” descent 
driving a Ford four-by-four Bronco towards the Mexican border.112 The 
officer knew that statistically this type of vehicle was the second-most 
likely to be stolen in Arizona, and based on meetings he had with county 
officials, he was “under the impression” that most of these vehicles were 
being stolen by “young, Mexican males.”113 The court held that the stop 
was invalid, in part because the defendant’s race was an irrelevant factor 
for the officer to consider: “We know of no statistics which would 
indicate that dark-skinned Mexican-Americans are more likely to be 
 
judge from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has strongly criticized the use of race 
as a factor in immigration enforcement cases, also drawing a parallel with Korematsu:  
[H]istory is likely to judge the judiciary’s evisceration of the Fourth Amendment 
in the vicinity of the Mexican border as yet another jurisprudential nadir, joining 
Korematsu, Dred Scott [v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)], and even 
Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)] on the list of our most shameful 
failures to discharge our duty of defending constitutional civil liberties against 
the popular hue and cry that would have us abridge them. 
United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., dissenting) 
(footnotes omitted). Many other courts have also rejected race as a legitimate factor under the 
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1184 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(recognizing in the Fourth Amendment context that police profiles used to screen potential plane 
hijackers may not “discriminate against any group on the basis of religion, origin, political views, 
or race”); Whitfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 837 F. Supp. 338, 344 (D. Colo. 1993) (“While 
race is an appropriate characteristic for identifying a particular suspect, it is wholly inappropriate 
to define a class of suspects.”); People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 119 (Cal. 1979) (stating “[a] 
person’s racial status is not an ‘unusual’ circumstance” contributing to reasonable suspicion), 
superseded in part by constitutional amendment, Proposition 8 (1982) (codified at CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 28(f)(2)); State v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (“No rational 
inference may be drawn from the race of one to be detained that he may be engaged in criminal 
activities.”); People v. Johnson, 478 N.Y.S.2d 987, 993 (App. Div. 1984) (noting race is relevant 
in the context of physical description but “[a] person’s racial status is neither an unusual 
circumstance nor probative of propensity to commit crime”). 
 111. 653 P.2d 683 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc). 
 112. Id. at 685–86. When pressed on this question, the officer admitted that he did not know 
at the time he made the decision to pull the car over “whether the driver was Mexican ‘rather than 
Armenian or Syrian’”—all he really knew was that the driver had “dark skin.” Id. at 686. This is 
a recurring issue in cases where law enforcement officers use race as a factor to generate 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause: the officer is in fact not really sure of the ethnicity of the 
suspect, only that he is not white. Often, as in United States v. Ramos, 629 F.3d 60, 62–64 (1st 
Cir. 2010), or in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975), the officer’s guess 
is incorrect. See Kevin R. Johnson, Essay, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of 
the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly 
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1022 (2010) (noting that the officer in Brignoni-Ponce 
believed the occupants of the car were all of Mexican descent, when in fact only one was of 
Mexican descent, while the others were Puerto Rican and Guatemalan). 
 113. Graciano, 653 P.2d at 685. 
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automobile thieves than light-skinned ones, nor that Mexican-Americans 
are more likely to be automobile thieves than Irish-Americans, Polish-
Americans, or any other subdivision of Americans.”114 
The different results in Weaver and Ramos on the one hand, and Farag 
and Graciano on the other, are the direct result of the different kinds of 
evidence the respective courts were willing to accept to meet the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge. In the former two cases, the 
courts accepted as evidence (in Weaver’s case) the testimony of the police 
officer linking the defendant’s race to a specific type of crime, or (in 
Ramos’ case) the “recent history” of Middle Easterners being involved in 
terrorist attacks.115 In the latter two cases, the courts set a standard that 
required empirical evidence linking the defendant’s race to the specific 
criminal activity that was suspected. As noted above, relying on an 
officer’s individual experiences or a judge’s subjective beliefs based on 
current events was probably a necessary evil in the past—not just for race, 
but for the correlation of any observed factor with criminal activity.116 As 
law enforcement becomes more data-driven, however, courts should 
follow the Farag and Graciano courts’ example and require the 
prosecutor to present empirically based evidence linking specific 
characteristics or observed behavior to criminal activity.  
The most widespread—and yet the least explicit—use of race as a 
factor is when police conduct Terry stops and traffic stops.117 Whether 
because of implicit bias, explicit racial prejudice, or a belief that certain 
races are more likely than others to engage in certain kinds of criminal 
activity, there is a vast amount of empirical evidence that police pull over 
 
 114. Id. at 686 (footnote omitted). 
 115. In fact, the “recent history” relied upon by the Ramos court consisted of only two 
incidents in four years: the bombing of a train station in Madrid in 2004 and the September 11th 
attacks in the United States in 2001. 629 F.3d at 66, 68. 
 116. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1992). The dissent 
found this aspect of the case troubling because using race as a factor “reinforces the kind of 
stereotyping that lies behind drug-courier profiles.” Id. at 397 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). But even 
the dissent agreed that “[i]f, for example, [the court] had evidence that young blacks in Los 
Angeles were more prone to drug offenses than young whites, the fact that a young person is black 
might be of some significance, though even then it would be dangerous to give it much weight.” 
Id.; see also United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332, 337 (D. Colo. 1990) (“[Officer] Perry, 
Officer Roybal and Sheriff A.J. Johnson all testified that being Black or Hispanic was and is a 
factor in their drug courier profile on which they decide who to stop and search.”). The judge in 
Laymon held the traffic stop of the Black defendants was unconstitutional because, although the 
arresting officer testified that the car was weaving before the stop, the judge found that testimony 
not credible. 730 F. Supp. at 338. The court further held that even if the car had been weaving, 
the weaving was a pretext and the officer’s true motivations for pulling the car over was the race 
of the car’s occupants. Id. at 339. This second part of the holding was probably overruled in Whren 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 819 (1996). See generally Johnson, supra note 112 (arguing 
that Brignoni-Ponce and Whren working together have legitimized racial profiling). 
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and stop Black and Hispanic individuals far more often than white 
individuals.118 But although the aggregate data demonstrates that the 
police use race as one of the factors in deciding whom to stop, in none of 
these cases does the prosecutor argue that the race of the suspect was a 
legitimate factor. Instead, the prosecutor points to race-neutral factors 
that justify the stop, arguing that race was irrelevant to the police officer’s 
decision—or, if it did influence the officer’s decision, there were 
sufficient race-neutral factors to justify the stop without taking into 
account the suspect’s race.119 As long as each individual stop is supported 
by objective reasonable suspicion as established by race-neutral factors, 
the Fourth Amendment is indifferent as to whether racial bias was a factor 
or even the primary motivator behind the officer’s actions. In Whren v. 
United States,120 the Court held that the police acted permissibly when 
they pulled a car over “based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as 
the race of the car’s occupants” because the stop was supported by 
probable cause.121 When courts do step into stop such practices, they do 
so under the Equal Protection Clause.122  
From a purely Fourth Amendment perspective, it is conceivable that 
race could be a legitimate factor in certain contexts, since there is some 
data to support that certain ethnic groups commit certain crimes at a 
greater rate.123 Sociologists and other experts have been debating the 
 
 118. See supra note 33; see also Gross & Livingstone, supra note 60, at 1420 (describing 
racial profiling by the Maryland and New Jersey state police on I-95). Of course, a Terry stop 
often leads to a frisk, while a traffic stop often leads to a request for a consent search or a canine 
sniff of the car, either of which could lead to a full-blown search of the car. 
 119. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 809 (describing the trial court’s acceptance of the argument 
that traffic violations independently created probable cause for the stop). 
 120. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 121. Id. at 810, 813 (“We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional 
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers 
involved. We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement 
of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to 
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth 
Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis.”). 
 122. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 123. National numbers tend to show that Black Americans are arrested at a higher rate than 
other races for violent crime, white Americans are arrested at a higher rate for drunk driving, and 
Asian Americans at a higher rate for illegal gambling. See Janet L. Lauritsen & Robert J. Sampson, 
Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME & PUNISHMENT 58, 62 
(Michael Tonry ed., 1998); see also Gary LaFree, Race and Crime Trends in the United States, 
1946-1990, in ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME 169, 170, 177 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1995) (finding 
that, in 1989, Blacks represented 12% of the population of the country but accounted for 64% of 
the robbery arrests and 55% of the homicide arrests, leading to the conclusion that “the hypothesis 
of no difference by race seems unlikely”); BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN UNITED STATES, 1999 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.40, tbl.46 (2001), 
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reasons for this disparity for years,124 but the underlying cause is 
immaterial for Fourth Amendment purposes: if there is an empirically 
 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus0102.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YKA-LEWG] (reporting 
that, in 1999, 46% of single-offender robberies were committed by Black individuals, and 38.2% 
of multiple-offender robberies were committed by Black individuals); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 
304 (2010) (noting that homicide rates are seven or eight times greater for Blacks than for whites); 
NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENT’G PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT 20 (2014) (reporting that, 
in 2012, Blacks represented 13% of the U.S. population but accounted for 39% of arrests for 
violent crimes and 29% of arrests for property crimes); Crim. Just. Info. Servs. Div., Table 43A: 
Arrests by Race, 2012, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (2012), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/ 
2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/43tabledatadecoverviewpdf [https://perma.cc/ZH83-LKAN] 
(reporting that, in 2012, Black individuals were 49.4% of the arrestees for murder and 
nonnegligent manslaughter and 54.9% of the arrestees for robbery); James Forman, Jr., Racial 
Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 46 (2012) 
(“While rates of drug offenses are roughly the same throughout the population, blacks are 
overrepresented among the population for violent offenses. For example, the African American 
arrest rate for murder is seven to eight times higher than the white arrest rate; the black arrest rate 
for robbery is ten times higher than the white arrest rate.”). 
The data based on arrests alone are suspect, since they are almost certainly skewed by bias in 
the policing and prosecution of crime. However, this bias becomes less pronounced for the most 
serious crimes, particularly murder. See LaFree, supra, at 175, 177. Also, data from non-law 
enforcement sources confirms this disparity. For example, public health data shows that Blacks 
are more likely to commit violent crimes. See Jessica H. Beard et al., Quantifying Disparities in 
Urban Firearm Violence by Race and Place in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: A Cartographic 
Study, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 371, 372 (2017) (“Firearm assaults were concentrated in low-
income areas with predominantly Black residents. Although living in a higher-income area was 
protective for the population overall, it did not protect Black residents from firearm violence to 
the same degree as white residents. . . . [O]ur findings echo those . . . [that] found that nationally, 
Black children were more likely than white children to be hospitalized with firearm injury 
regardless of neighborhood income level.”). 
On the other hand, there appears to be no significant difference between different races for 
drug crimes. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 578 (2003) (“Numerous commentators have rejected the possibility of 
substantial racial differences in drug crime on the basis of survey findings regarding rates of illicit 
drug use among various racial groups.”); Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and Crime, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1058 (2010) (“The increase in racial disparities in 
incarceration can be attributed mainly to selective enforcement of drug laws. . . . [T]here is no 
evidence that African Americans disproportionately commit drug offenses.”). 
 124. The reasons posited for higher violent crime rates among Blacks include: (1) structural 
and cultural disorganization and isolation, stemming from poverty, family disruption, and 
residential instability, Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, 
Crime, and Urban Inequality, in RACE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 177, 182 (Shaun L. Gabbidon & 
Helen Taylor Greene eds., 2005); (2) “social and environmental conditions such as poverty, 
miserable schools, broken families, lack of access to health care, and even lead poisoning”—all 
factors that are “linked to racial subordination,” Butler, supra note 123, at 1058–59 (footnotes 
omitted); and (3) a lack of “community-level social processes such as the level of supervision of 
teenage peer groups, the prevalence of friendship networks, and the level of residential 
participation in formal organizations,” Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken 
Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 474 (2000) 
(quoting Tracey Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 669, 673 (1998)). 
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demonstrable link between race and specific criminal activity, it is a 
legitimate factor to consider in determining reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.125 There are also contexts in which a suspect’s race 
makes it less likely that the police have reasonable suspicion—for 
example, due to a known pattern of racial profiling and police brutality 
against Black suspects, a Black person fleeing from the police is probably 
less likely to be guilty than a non-Black person fleeing from the police.126 
However, police and prosecutors alike almost never explicitly link 
race to a likelihood of criminal activity in the context of Terry stops or 
traffic stops. Not only would such an effort likely fail under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but it would also create strong political backlash. And 
yet there is one area in which police openly and explicitly use race as a 
factor in justifying their searches and seizures, and in which the Supreme 
Court has legitimized the practice: the investigation of immigration 
violations. 
D.  Immigration: The Hard Cases that Make Bad Law 
Although numerous lower courts have considered the question of 
whether race can be a legitimate factor in determining individualized 
suspicion, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue only twice, both in 
the context of immigration violations. In United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,127 the Court held that “Mexican ancestry” can be a factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion for illegal immigration.128 A year later 
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,129 the Court held that once cars had 
been legally stopped at a checkpoint, it was constitutional for border 
patrol agents to select cars for further investigation based in large part on 
the perceived race of the driver.130 
 
 125. Although gender and race are treated differently under the law, it is worth noting that 
gender is often considered a legitimate factor in sex offender classification hearings, under the 
presumption that men are statistically more likely to commit this crime than women. Cf. Doe v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 999 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Mass. 2013) (holding that it was “arbitrary and 
capricious” for the Sex Offender Registry Board to classify the female defendant’s risk of re-
offense and degree of dangerousness without considering the effect of gender on recidivism). 
 126. See Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016); Miles v. United 
States, 181 A.3d 633, 641–44, 641 n.14 (D.C. 2018); cf. United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 
687–88 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that a Black citizen may feel less free to leave a supposedly 
consensual encounter with police).  
 127. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 128. Id. at 886–87. 
 129. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 130. Id. at 563–64, 564 n.17. The Court decided that the procedure being used by the border 
patrol was effective: 
Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area during the eight 
days surrounding the arrests . . . roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Thus, to 
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As the only Supreme Court cases on the question of race as a factor in 
generating individualized suspicion, these two cases have had an 
enormous influence on lower courts who wrestle with this question. At a 
minimum, these cases have been cited to prove that there is statistical 
evidence linking ethnic appearance to immigration violations.131 
Furthermore, nearly every court that allows the use of race as a factor in 
determining individualized suspicion outside of the immigration context 
relies on these cases to justify its decision.132 Many scholars see these 
cases as an infection, spreading from a context in which race is 
undeniably relevant to the criminalized conduct in the immigration 
context and corrupting the analysis of other types of cases, where they 
are used to support theories of racial incongruity, criminal profiling, and 
racial propensity.133 Many scholars attempt to quarantine the immigration 
cases, conceding that racial background is a legitimate factor in the 
immigration context but arguing that immigration cases are sui 
generis.134 However, there are two reasons to question the validity of 
these two cases: first, they engage in erroneous statistical analysis to 
support their Fourth Amendment argument; second, they give insufficient 
weight to the Equal Protection argument. This Section considers the first 
critique, and Part III discusses the Equal Protection question. 
  
 
the extent that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this 
checkpoint, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law enforcement need to be 
served.  
Id. at 564 n.17 (citations omitted).  
 131. See, e.g., Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing the 
statistics from Brignoni-Ponce and then stating that “[t]o the Court’s knowledge, no court has 
ever marshaled statistics to conclude that racial or ethnic appearance is correlated with, and thus 
probative of, any type of criminal conduct other than immigration violations”).  
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 629 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Brignoni-
Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte as precedent for the proposition that “in a reasonable suspicion 
inquiry, a person’s appearance is not per se an impermissible or irrelevant consideration”). 
 133. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 112, at 1039–43, 1075. 
 134. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 60, at 248–49 (conceding that race is a legitimate factor 
in the immigration context under the Fourth Amendment but saying it should be illegal under the 
Equal Protection Clause); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling 
and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 733 (2002) (stating that the context 
of Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte are different from ordinary law enforcement activities 
because “Mexican ethnicity is uniquely important for immigration policing on the southern 
border, and the Border Patrol has the unusual authority to detain people without individualized 
suspicion at the border itself or at checkpoints in the border area”). But see Maclin, supra note 19, 
at 365–69 (accepting the use of race in the immigration context and arguing that courts should 
apply the rationales of Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte when analyzing the reasonableness 
of the disparate use of Terry stops and traffic stops against non-whites). 
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1. Statistical Fallacies 
As discussed earlier, under the Fourth Amendment a suspect’s race 
can be considered in the reasonable suspicion or probable cause analysis 
only if the state proves a correlation between a suspect’s race and criminal 
activity.135 In the case of immigration violations, many courts appear to 
assume that such a correlation exists without empirical evidence. When 
courts rely on empirical evidence, they often misuse or misinterpret it. 
A prominent example of this misuse can be found in Brignoni-Ponce, 
the first major Supreme Court Fourth Amendment immigration case.136 
In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held that, although a suspect’s race alone 
could not justify a stop for immigration violations, the suspect’s race 
could be a relevant factor among other factors in determining whether 
reasonable suspicion existed since “[t]he likelihood that any given person 
of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican 
appearance a relevant factor.”137 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger supported this holding by stating how many illegal aliens 
are of Mexican descent rather than arguing how many individuals of 
Mexican descent are illegal aliens.138 
 
 135. See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
 136. See 422 U.S. 873, 874 (1975). 
 137. Id. at 885–87. This statement highlights another, broader problem with immigration 
stops. Section 287(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act allowed law enforcement officers 
“to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the 
United States.” Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 287(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 233 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)). Thus, on its face, the statute allowed law 
enforcement officers to indiscriminately stop aliens who are legally in the country (and 
presumably have committed no crime) alongside aliens who are illegally in this country. The 
Court assumed for the purposes of its decision that Congress’s broad power over immigration 
“authorize[d] Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit to reasonable 
questioning about their right to be and remain in the country.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883. 
Not only does this assumption reduce the Fourth Amendment rights of all non-citizens residing 
in this country, but it also reduces the rights of any citizen in this country who may be “believed 
to be an alien.” Whether or not the Court’s assumption is correct is a very significant question, 
since it could dramatically increase the probability that race is a useful factor in making an 
immigration stop. Assuming that legal aliens and illegal aliens could both be legally stopped also 
allowed the Brignoni-Ponce Court to be somewhat sloppy with the numbers that it cited: at one 
point the Court noted that there were 3.8 million “persons of Mexican origin” living in the four 
border states and that 624,000 of them had “registered as aliens,” which means that 16% of all 
individuals of Mexican origin in that region were legal aliens. Id. at 886 n.12. If border police are 
permitted to stop any alien rather than only illegal aliens, then Hispanic heritage becomes much 
more likely to be a legitimate factor under the Fourth Amendment. 
 138. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 901 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that 
85% of illegal aliens come from Mexico). This statistic, which was submitted by the Government 
as evidence that it was appropriate to target individuals of “Mexican descent,” was also cited in 
the majority opinion, though it is unclear the degree to which the majority relied upon it. See 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879, 886.  
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This flawed statistical argument justifying race as a factor in 
immigration investigations has trickled down to the lower courts. For 
example, in United States v. Vandyck-Aleman,139 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it is appropriate for law 
enforcement officers to consider ethnicity in deciding whether to question 
a suspect for an immigration violation:  
Although ethnicity generally may play no role in the 
enforcement of criminal laws of this country, enforcement 
of the immigration laws demands that the officials focus on 
individuals most likely to violate those laws. In the poultry-
producing region of Scott County, Mississippi . . . the 
population of illegal aliens is predominantly Hispanic, not 
(non-Hispanic) white.140  
Thus, the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce, and 
by lower courts in cases like Vandyck-Aleman, focuses on whether people 
who commit immigration violations are more likely to be of Hispanic 
descent. But this logic is backwards: the question is not whether people 
who commit immigration violations tend to be of a certain race but rather 
the likelihood that a member of that race has committed the crime. To see 
the difference, assume the population of individuals who commit the 
crime of driving under the influence is predominantly white—that is, of 
all the individuals who commit the crime of drunk driving in a certain 
jurisdiction, 90% of them are white and 10% are not. This would surely 
not allow police to use a person’s white ethnicity as a factor in 
determining whether to pull them over. Likewise, if in a certain 
neighborhood 90% of the people who sell drugs are Black, that fact alone 
would not allow police to use a person’s ethnicity as a factor in deciding 
whether to conduct a Terry stop for drugs. The significant number for 
Fourth Amendment purposes is what percentage of people of that given 
ethnicity are committing the crime in question and the discrepancy 
between that percentage and the percentage of people of other ethnicities 
who are committing the crime.  
Thus, in our hypothetical it is irrelevant that 90% of the people who 
drive under the influence are white. Instead, the numbers that police and 
courts need to focus on are (1) the percentage of white people who are 
driving under the influence, and (2) the percentage of non-white people 
who are driving under the influence. Both the absolute numbers and the 
ratio between the numbers are significant. For example, assume that at 
any given moment .06% of white people are driving under the influence, 
while .03% of non-whites are driving under the influence. It is true that a 
white person is twice as likely to be committing the crime as a non-white 
 
 139. 201 F. App’x 215 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 140. Id. at 218. 
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person, but the person’s ethnicity is still almost useless in helping the 
officer achieve reasonable suspicion because the absolute number of 
white people committing the crime is so low.141 Or perhaps at a certain 
time of the night in a certain part of town, the likelihood of drunk driving 
increases substantially, such that 20% of all white people and 19% of all 
non-white people are driving under the influence. In this case, even 
though the percentage of white people committing the crime is relatively 
high, it is so close to the percentage of other ethnicities committing the 
crime that once again the suspect’s ethnicity is useless in making a 
reasonable suspicion determination. In order for ethnicity to be a useful 
factor under the Fourth Amendment, there must be evidence of both a 
significant percentage of people of that ethnicity who commit the crime 
and a significant difference in the rate of committing that crime between 
people of that ethnicity and other ethnicities.142 In Brignoni-Ponce, the 
Supreme Court had no such data. 
This is not the only statistical fallacy to which courts fall victim when 
determining whether race is a legitimate factor to use under the Fourth 
Amendment. Outside the immigration context, this Article identified how 
the Oneonta court incorrectly used the percentage of individuals of the 
suspect’s race compared to the general population.143 Still another 
fallacy—this one common in the immigration context—is to cite the total 
number of individuals of a certain race that live in the jurisdiction. For 
 
 141. Ironically, the Supreme Court recognized this statistical principle one year after 
Brignoni-Ponce in an Equal Protection case involving gender discrimination. In Craig v. Boren, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of an Oklahoma law that permitted women to purchase 
3.2% beer at the age of eighteen but prohibited men from purchasing it until they reached the age 
of twenty-one. 429 U.S. 190, 191–92 (1976). The Court applied intermediate scrutiny to the 
statute, stating that any gender-based classifications must serve “important governmental 
objectives” and be “substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 197. The State 
sought to meet this standard with studies that showed that 0.18% of females and 2% of males in 
the 18–20 age group were arrested for drunk driving. Id. at 201. The Court agreed that this was a 
significant disparity but held that the absolute number of 2% was too low to support any link 
between “maleness” and drunk driving. Id. at 201–02. 
 142. Professors Gross and Livingstone come close to this conclusion but fail to come to the 
statistically correct conclusion. They note: 
Even if race or ethnicity is a strong predictor of criminal behavior, an individual 
member of the relevant groups is very unlikely to be a criminal. For example, it 
could simultaneously be true that 90% of major cocaine traffickers on I-95 are 
black and Hispanic, and that 99.9% of black and Hispanic motorists on that 
highway are not drug traffickers of any description.  
Gross & Livingstone, supra note 60, at 1423 (footnote omitted). They conclude that under these 
conditions, choosing suspects by race will increase the efficiency of the police, but “the benefit to 
law enforcement may be slight.” Id. However, they fail to consider the other significant factor: 
the difference between the rate of committing the given crime for people of the given ethnicity 
and the rate of committing the given crime for other ethnicities. 
 143. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
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example, in United States v. Montero-Camargo,144 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that law enforcement officers cannot 
use Hispanic heritage in determining whether reasonable suspicion 
existed for a traffic stop to look for immigration violations.145 However, 
in doing so, it relied in part on the large number of Hispanics who were 
present in the jurisdiction.146 Given the fact that the majority of 
individuals who lived in the county were Hispanic, the court concluded 
that “Hispanic appearance is of little or no use in determining which 
particular individuals among the vast Hispanic populace should be 
stopped by law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal aliens.”147 
But the total number of Hispanics is irrelevant to the analysis; if 80% of 
all Hispanics in the county were undocumented immigrants, and only 
10% of non-Hispanics were undocumented immigrants, then Hispanic 
heritage would be a legitimate factor regardless of how many individuals 
shared that characteristic.148 The Ninth Circuit used the same logic to 
make a mistake in the other direction in United States v. Manzo-
Jurado.149 The Manzo-Juardo court approved of the use of race as a 
factor when immigration officials were looking for illegal immigrants in 
the town of Havre, Montana, distinguishing the case from its earlier 
decision rejecting race as a factor in Montero-Camargo.150 The Ninth 
Circuit noted that unlike the town in Montero-Camargo, Havre is 
“sparsely populated” with Hispanics.151 Therefore, it was somehow more 
likely that being of Hispanic heritage in Havre was correlated with 
undocumented status. 
 
 144. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
To the Court’s knowledge, no court has ever marshaled statistics to conclude that racial or ethnic 
appearance is correlated with, and thus probative of, any type of criminal conduct other than 
immigration violations. 
 145. Id. at 1131. 
 146. See id. at 1133 (“The population of Imperial County, in which El Centro is located, is 
73% Hispanic. In Imperial County, as of 1998, Hispanics accounted for 105,355 of the total 
population of 144,051.”). 
 147. Id. at 1134. 
 148. The Montero-Camargo court tried to argue that the large percentage of Hispanic 
residents meant that Hispanic heritage could not be used to generate particularized suspicion, 
since race was shared among so many potential suspects. See id. at 1134 (“Reasonable suspicion 
requires particularized suspicion, and in an area in which a large number of people share a specific 
characteristic, that characteristic casts too wide a net to play any part in a particularized reasonable 
suspicion determination.”). It is correct that a widely shared characteristic cannot be sufficient on 
its own to generate particularized suspicion, but as long as the individual also engages in 
suspicious individualized behavior, the particularized suspicion requirement will be met.  
 149. 457 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 150. Id. at 935 & n.6. 
 151. Id. at 935 n.6 (noting that Hispanics only made up 1.5% of the population of Havre). 
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2.  Actual Correlation and the Need for Empirical Evidence 
The failure of most courts to cite and properly use statistical evidence 
when reviewing immigration stops is particularly disheartening, since 
this is one area where statistics should be particularly useful. Many 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion determinations are so fact-based 
and subjective that they are nearly impossible to quantify, but others, such 
as the link between racial background and immigration status, are 
susceptible to statistical analysis. Professor Andrew Crespo recently 
created a useful Fourth Amendment taxonomy to respond to the increased 
use of empirical data and statistical analysis in our criminal justice 
system.152 Professor Crespo divides search and seizure fact patterns into 
four categories: primary and ultimate facts, thin scripts, narrative 
mosaics, and mixed claims.153 The first category encompasses cases in 
which a witness personally observes criminal activity; thus, assuming the 
source of the information is credible and accurate, the evidence positively 
proves the existence of illegal activity.154 Examples include a victim 
reporting to the police that the suspect assaulted her, or a police officer 
asserting that she purchased narcotics from the suspect. The second 
category includes cases in which a single fact, or small set of interrelated 
facts, establish the constitutionally required standard of suspicion.155 
Examples include cases based on probability, such as when the police 
pull over a car for drunk driving and then find nobody in the driver’s seat 
but observe three drunk men apparently asleep in the back seat.156 They 
also include “profile” cases that were discussed earlier in the article, when 
police claim that certain characteristics or patterns of behavior indicate a 
high probability of criminal activity.157 The third category is comprised 
 
 152. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 YALE L. J. 1276, 1282 
(2020). 
 153. Id. at 1289 fig.1. 
 154. Id. at 1290. 
 155. Id. at 1291. 
 156. See id. at 1291–92. The Supreme Court decided a similar case in Maryland v. Pringle, 
in which the police pulled over a car for speeding and found cocaine hidden in the car after a 
consent search. 540 U.S. 366, 368 (2003). All three occupants of the car denied knowledge of the 
cocaine, but the Supreme Court held that there was probable cause to arrest each of them. Id. at 
372. Pringle is distinguishable from the drunk driving case, since in the latter only one of the three 
can be guilty, whereas in Pringle it was possible for all three individuals to have knowledge of, 
and thus constructively possess, the cocaine. Id. 
 157. Crespo, supra note 152, at 1292. Professor Crespo gives the following examples:  
Some common examples include claims that “people carrying significant 
amounts of illegal drugs” tend “to be carrying guns” or tend to have additional 
evidence of drug dealing in their houses; that people who engage in child 
molestation tend to possess child pornography on their computers; that people 
who flee from the police in so-called high-crime areas tend to possess 
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of unique stories told about the defendant’s behavior that defy statistical 
analysis.158 These cases involve detailed fact patterns that require holistic 
evaluation and intuitive analysis.159 The final category, “mixed claims,” 
includes cases in which police use statistical data as a factor but then add 
a narrative to achieve the necessary level of suspicion.160  
A key benefit of using this taxonomy is that it isolates the types of 
cases in which courts should require empirically valid statistical evidence 
from the prosecutor. If law enforcement officers claim a correlation 
between an observed condition (such as the race of the suspect) and the 
illegal activity being investigated (such as the undocumented status of the 
suspect), and the correlation can be empirically demonstrated, then courts 
should set a standard that requires the government to produce that 
empirical analysis in court.161 Setting a standard that requires the 
government to cite empirical evidence in these cases is especially 
important when the government is using race as a factor, given the long 
history of inaccurate correlations that police have made between race and 
criminal activity when relying on subjective factors. As Professor 
Barbara Underwood noted: “[D]ecisionmakers may be influenced by 
negative views about minority racial groups to make negative predictions 
even when the predictive power of race is nonexistent.”162  
Indeed, in Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court rejected the use of 
ethnicity as the sole factor to establish probable cause because the 
government had not established the requisite statistical evidence to prove 
the correlation.163 As noted above, the Court’s own calculations in 
determining the statistical correlation were suspect, but the Court did 
explicitly acknowledge that more statistical data would be necessary 
before using ethnicity as the sole factor to prove probable cause.164 
The holding of Brignoni-Ponce places the reasonable 
suspicion/probable cause inquiry for undocumented immigrants squarely 
into Professor Crespo’s “Mixed Claims” category: a person’s race may 
 
contraband; or that Latinos driving certain vehicles near the border tend to be 
engaged in illegal smuggling.  
Id. at 1292–93 (footnotes omitted). Professor Crespo also includes in this category certain 
mechanical processes, such as fingerprint analysis or drug-dog sniffing, that depend upon the 
reliability of the machine to create a sufficient statistical link between the positive result and 
criminal activity. Id. at 1292. 
 158. Id. at 1309–10. 
 159. Id. at 1310.  
 160. Id. at 1318–21.  
 161. See id. at 1319–20 (“If [the Government] claims that its search or seizure is supported 
by statistical probabilities rather than a mere ‘hunch,’ it must come forward with the relevant data 
to back up that claim.”). 
 162. Underwood, supra note 59, at 1434–35.  
 163. 422 U.S. 873, 886–87, 886 n.12 (1975).  
 164. See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text. 
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be considered as a factor, but it may not be used on its own to establish 
the constitutionally required level of suspicion. And as long as the 
government is relying on an empirically testable correlation as a factor, 
the courts should require the government to provide relevant data to 
support its use of race as a factor.  
The necessary data to test this correlation either exists or could be 
obtained. The percentage of Hispanics in a given jurisdiction that are 
undocumented immigrants is a quantifiable number—perhaps impossible 
to state with exact precision but certainly a number that can be estimated 
with reasonable accuracy. Indeed, national estimates of the numbers and 
race of undocumented immigrants are readily available,165 and they can 
be compared to the total population of different demographic groups in 
the country.166 For example, as of 2017, roughly 13.5% of the Hispanics 
living in the United States were undocumented immigrants, compared to 
8.4% of the Asian Americans living in the country, 0.6% of Blacks living 
in the country, and 0.2% of the non-Hispanic white individuals living in 
the country.167 If courts require statistics more narrowly tailored to the 
specific case—for example, the percentage of Hispanics who are 
undocumented in Arizona,168 or the percentage who are undocumented in 
 
 165. As of 2016, there are approximately 10.7 million undocumented immigrants in the 
United States. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RSCH. CTR., U.S. UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT TOTAL DIPS TO LOWEST LEVEL IN A DECADE 5 (2018), https://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
2018/11/27/u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-total-dips-to-lowest-level-in-a-decade/ [https://perma. 
cc/VHZ3-YSC3]. Of those, approximately half a million are Caucasian; nearly 8 million are 
Hispanic, 1.3 million are Asian, and the rest are from the Middle East, Africa, or the Caribbean. 
Id. at 6. 
 166. 58.8 million residents in the United States are Hispanic, 197.2 million are non-Hispanic 
white residents, 40.1 million are Black, and 22.4 million are Asian American. Hispanic or Latino 
Origin by Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B03&d= 
ACS%201-Year%20Estimates%20Detailed%20Tables&tid=ACSDT1Y2017.B03002 [https:// 
perma.cc/9K6V-NTX]; Asian Alone or in Any Combination by Selected Groups, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2018), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml? 
src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/2W68-EALU]; 2011-2015 ACS 5-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (June 7, 2019), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-documentation 
/table-and-geography-changes/2015/5-year.html [https://perma.cc/62C8-E82E]. 
 167.  See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 165, at 6; Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, How 
Many Undocumented Immigrants Are in the United States and Who Are They?, BROOKINGS INST. 
(Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-many-undocumented-
immigrants-are-in-the-united-states-and-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/QCS3-MHZH]; ACS 
Demographic and Housing Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://data.census.gov/ 
cedsci/table?d=ACS%205-Year%20Estimates%20Data%20Profiles&table=DP05&tid=ACSDP 
5Y2017.DP05 [https://perma.cc/J5JU-SGFA]. 
 168. For example, the estimated percentage of Arizona’s population that consisted of 
undocumented immigrants in 2016 was 3.9% (275,000 people). See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 
165, at 31; Table 1. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, 
States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), 
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a specific county in Arizona—the government should have the burden of 
calculating those statistics and presenting them to the court.  
Instead, the government—when it presents any empirical information 
at all—offers incomplete statistics that fail to prove the necessary 
correlation. For example, in Melendres v. Arpaio169 plaintiffs brought a 
class action suit against the local sheriff on behalf of all Hispanics in 
Maricopa County, Arizona who “have been or will be in the future 
stopped, detained, questioned or searched” by the sheriff’s office.170 In 
its defense, the sheriff called an expert who testified that “8.9% of the 
population of the state of Arizona was made up of unauthorized 
immigrants,” and that he therefore “assumed that approximately one in 
three Hispanic residents of Maricopa County was here without 
authorization.”171 This assumption takes a number of logical steps 
unsupported by data, including that the demographic breakdown of 
Maricopa County is identical to that of all of Arizona and that all 
undocumented immigrants are of Hispanic descent.172 
E.  Race as a Legitimate Fourth Amendment Factor 
Under certain circumstances, race could be a relevant factor for 
consideration in the Fourth Amendment analysis, especially in the 
immigration context. But since the correlation between race and criminal 
 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2019/state/totals/nst-est2019-01. 
xlsx. Applying the 2016 national average of 74% of all undocumented immigrants being 
Hispanic, see PASSEL & COHN, supra note 165, at 20; Kamarck & Stenglein, supra note 167, that 
would mean about 203,500 people of Arizona’s undocumented immigrant population is Hispanic, 
out of a total Arizona Hispanic population of 2.1 million, Latinos in the 2016 Election: Arizona, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.pew research.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/latinos-in-the-
2016-election-arizona/ [https://perma.cc/NY6R-89MG]. This means that about 9.7% of Hispanic 
residents of Arizona are undocumented immigrants. Of course, the percentage of undocumented 
immigrants who are Hispanic could be different in Arizona than it is for the country at large; the 
burden of calculating those numbers would be on the government, who is trying to demonstrate 
the relevance (if any) of race to status as an undocumented immigrant. 
 169. 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013), adhered to by No. CV–07–02513–PHX–GMS, 
2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 170. Id. at 826. 
 171. Id. at 828 n.4. 
 172. Id. Indeed, the court made this second assumption explicit, holding that “if Dr. 
Camarota’s testimony is applied, and one assumes that virtually all of the unauthorized residents 
in the state are of Latino ancestry, about 73% of the Latino residents of Maricopa County are legal 
residents of the United States.” Id. The district court ultimately rejected the sheriff’s defense, 
holding that under Ninth Circuit law, race could not be a factor in determining probable cause, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s Brignoni–Ponce dicta. Id. at 897–99. The district court cited 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc). Melendres, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 896–97. As noted above, Montero-Camargo engages in 
a flawed analysis, since it relied on the total number of Hispanics in the region, which is irrelevant 
to the individualized suspicion analysis. See supra notes 144–148 and accompanying text. 
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conduct is an empirically measurable number (a “thin script,” in 
Professor Crespo’s taxonomy),173 the courts should demand empirical 
evidence from the government before allowing law enforcement to rely 
upon it. As noted above, the first step in analyzing this empirical evidence 
will be to ensure that it is not tainted by pre-existing bias in the criminal 
justice system.174 Much of the existing data may need to be abandoned, 
or at least recalibrated, to take into account the disproportionate rates of 
arrests and convictions of non-white defendants. 
Courts will also need to refine the exact nature of the requirement for 
empirical evidence, such as how specifically tailored the evidence must 
be (for example, whether national numbers are sufficient, or whether 
county-level numbers are necessary). And when courts conduct their 
statistical analysis, only two questions are relevant: (1) what percentage 
of individuals of the suspect’s race commit the crime in question (the 
“commission percentage”), and (2) the differential between that number 
and the percentage of individuals who are not of the suspect’s race who 
commit the crime (the “percentage differential”). Courts will still need to 
determine what commission percentage and percentage differential is 
required to establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
III.  REGULATING RACE PART II: THE EQUAL PROTECTION QUESTION 
While the Fourth Amendment is only concerned with whether a search 
is supported by the requisite level of individualized suspicion,175 the 
Equal Protection Clause is concerned with preventing the disparate 
treatment of certain protected classes on the basis of certain protected 
characteristics.176 At times, the Supreme Court has supported a broad 
 
 173. Crespo, supra note 152, at 1289–91. 
 174. See supra notes 39, 123 and accompanying text. 
 175. Technically, the Fourth Amendment requires that searches be “reasonable”; the 
Supreme Court has linked the reasonableness of the search to, among other factors, whether law 
enforcement has reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–
25 (1968). 
 176. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which does not protect individuals in the “pre-contact 
stage” before the police actually engage with the subject, supra note 42 and accompanying text, 
the Equal Protection Clause applies in the pre-contact stage of the investigation when the police 
are first making a decision of whom to target for investigation. United States v. Jennings, 985 
F.2d 562, 1993 WL 5927, at *4 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion); United States v. 
Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 353 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A citizen’s right to equal protection of the laws, 
however, does not magically materialize when he is approached by the police. Citizens are cloaked 
at all times with the right to have the laws applied to them in an equal fashion—undeniably, the 
right not to be exposed to the unfair application of the laws based on their race.”); see also Farm 
Lab. Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 536, 538 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(distinguishing Avery because Avery involved a consensual police encounter); infra notes 201–
203 and accompanying text (discussing Farm Labor Organizing Committee). Commentators have 
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interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, stating in dictum that “the 
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on 
considerations such as race.”177 Commentators have almost unanimously 
agreed with the principle that any use of race as a factor in criminal 
investigations should violate the Equal Protection Clause.178 In reality, 
however, many courts—including the Supreme Court⎯have been more 
forgiving of the practice.179  
 
almost unanimously agreed with the principle that any use of race as a factor in criminal 
investigations violates the Equal Protection Clause, but most of them also concede that the courts 
have not consistently enforced it. See, e.g., Gross & Barnes, supra note 134, at 744 (stating that 
“[t]he use of race as a factor in decisions to stop, search, or arrest is clearly prohibited by the 
Equal Protection Clause,” but acknowledging that “few cases have been litigated under that 
provision, and the law on the issue remains sparse and undeveloped” and noting that a number of 
lower courts have allowed the use of evidence from drug searches that were based in part on the 
suspect’s race); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial 
Profiling and Stops and Searches without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 363–66 (2001); 
Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 117, 124 
(2001). Other commentators make arguments against the use of race on primarily policy grounds. 
Professor Chris Slobogin has argued, “the symbolic and actual effect of this type of government 
action damages societal institutions regardless of its empirical justification.” Chris Slobogin, The 
World Without A Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 85–86 (1991); see also Ronald J. 
Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 304 (2004) 
(arguing that the most “valid objections to profiling . . . involve policy considerations independent 
of the empirical validity of the profiles”). 
 177. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). With regard to the use of race as a 
factor in sentencing, the Supreme Court has used equally strong language, stating that race is a 
factor “that [is] constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process.” 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). Many lower courts have applied an equally broad 
test. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[I]t is 
equally clear that it is impermissible to subject all members of a racially defined group to 
heightened police enforcement because some members of that group appear more frequently in 
criminal complaints. The Equal Protection Clause does not permit race-based suspicion.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Gross & Barnes, supra note 134, at 744 (stating that “[t]he use of race as a 
factor in decisions to stop, search, or arrest is clearly prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause,” 
but acknowledging that “few cases have been litigated under that provision, and the law on the 
issue remains sparse and undeveloped” and noting that a number of lower courts have allowed 
the use of evidence from drug searches that were based in part on the suspect’s race); David 
Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and 
Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 363–66 (2001); Tracey Maclin, The Fourth 
Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 117, 124 (2001). 
Other commentators make arguments against the use of race primarily on policy grounds. 
Professor Christopher Slobogin has argued that “the symbolic and actual effect of this type of 
government action damages societal institutions regardless of its empirical justification.” 
Slobogin, supra note 176, at  84–86; see also Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The 
Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 301 (2004) (“[V]alid objections to profiling . . . 
involve policy considerations independent of the empirical validity of the profiles.”).  
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975); United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976); United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 
1995) (stating that Equal Protection rights are not violated when “officers . . . decide to interview 
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Under the Equal Protection Clause, the use of race as a factor in 
criminal investigations could trigger strict scrutiny in one of two ways. 
The first way is if the government explicitly uses race as a basis to treat 
similarly situated individuals differently.180 As noted in the previous 
section, the government rarely admits to intentionally using race as a 
factor, but even when it does, the courts do not automatically apply strict 
scrutiny to the government’s actions.181 
The legal landscape becomes even more complicated if the decision-
maker does not admit to discriminating based on race. In order to trigger 
strict scrutiny in such cases, the defendant must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the government’s application of supposedly race-
neutral factors produced a disparate impact and that the government acted 
with a discriminatory purpose.182  
Courts have been inconsistent when applying these standards in the 
criminal justice context. Under one line of cases, any disproportionate 
effect on a suspect class shifts the burden to the government to prove a 
race-neutral reason for its action.183 Under another line of cases, the 
burden of proof never shifts, and the plaintiff must prove the state had a 
discriminatory motivation.184 A third line of cases provides that even an 
explicit finding of discriminatory intent is insufficient as long as the 
government also used other race-neutral factors.185  
Even if the plaintiffs convince the court to apply strict scrutiny, the 
government still has the opportunity to demonstrate that the 
 
a suspect for many reasons, some of which are legitimate and some of which may be based on 
race”). But see United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578–79 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (stating 
that if the state’s drug courier profile “had incorporated a racial component” it would raise Equal 
Protection questions). As one pair of commentators noted:  
In practice, the value of the Equal Protection Clause as a remedy for 
discrimination in criminal investigations is deeply compromised by the near 
impossibility of proof. As a result, few cases are litigated, and the legal doctrine 
remains undeveloped. Even the central issue of remedy is unsettled. The 
Supreme Court has explicitly left the question open, and few lower court 
opinions address the issue.  
The few reported cases that are available are often muddled. 
Gross & Barnes, supra note 134, at 741 (footnote omitted). 
 180. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879), abrogated in part by 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
299 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 181. See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text.  
 182. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 608 (1985). 
 183. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97–98 (1986); infra notes 228–231 and 
accompanying text. 
 184. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292–93; infra notes 221–226 and accompanying text. 
 185. See United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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discrimination was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest 
and that a race-neutral alternative was not available.186  
A.  Suspect Classification 
Many commentators argue that the explicit use of race in any facet of 
the criminal justice system should trigger strict scrutiny because any 
state-sponsored “racial classification” invokes the protections of the 
Equal Protection Clause.187 This argument finds some support in caselaw. 
For example, in Strauder v. West Virginia188 the Supreme Court struck 
down a statute that disqualified Blacks from jury duty because of their 
race, since such explicit race-based discrimination “amounts to a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws.”189  
However, the Supreme Court has never directly held that using race 
as one factor among many in the criminal investigation context amounts 
to a “suspect classification” akin to the bright-line tests in cases like 
Strauder. In the sentencing context, the Court has stated in dicta that it 
would be “constitutionally impermissible” or “patently unconstitutional” 
to consider the race of the defendant as an aggravating circumstance in 
the penalty phase of a capital case.190 But in the investigative context, 
courts have often held that the government is permitted to use race as one 
of multiple factors in deciding whom to target for investigation, as long 
 
 186. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235, 237 (1995); United States 
v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 356 (6th Cir. 1997); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984); 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720, 735 (2007); Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 339 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016). 
 187. See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New 
Statistical and Legal Framework, 119 MICH. L. REV. 291, 302, 310 (2020). Many commentators 
have argued that using racial classifications as a factor in the sentencing context would 
automatically trigger (and fail) the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 811–12 
(2014) (noting that “risk prediction instruments used by some parole boards included race until as 
late as the 1970s,” but no state now formally uses risk assessment software that uses race as a 
factor because “[t]here appears to be a general consensus that using race would be 
unconstitutional”); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 696 (2015) 
(“The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leaves no room for race-conscious risk-assessment tools.”); 
Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Juvenile Justice, CRIM. JUST., 
Winter 2013, at 10, 14 (“[M]ost courts have accepted the proposition that race may not be 
considered in determining dangerousness.”).  
 188. 100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated in part by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).  
 189. Id. at 310. 
 190. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983); Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) 
(holding that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for a defense attorney to introduce expert 
testimony showing a connection between his own client’s race and future dangerousness in the 
sentencing phase); see also Sidhu, supra note 187, at 696–97 (arguing that a majority of Justices 
in 2011 would support this position based on their language in denying a petition for certiorari in 
a precursor to the Buck v. Davis case). 
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as they do not target an individual solely on the basis of race.191 In United 
States v. Travis,192 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
that “[i]n some instances, officers may decide to interview a suspect for 
many reasons, some of which are legitimate and some of which may be 
based on race. In such instances . . . the use of race in [the targeting] stage 
does not give rise to any constitutional protections.”193  
As in the Fourth Amendment context, the source of this judicial 
leniency towards racial discrimination originates in the Supreme Court’s 
controversial pair of immigration cases: Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-
Fuerte. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court approved in dicta the use of race as 
a factor in the targeting stage.194 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court went even 
further by approving law enforcement’s post-contact use of race as a 
factor. The Martinez-Fuerte Court upheld the procedure of prolonging a 
pre-existing detention based in part on race, noting that “even if it be 
assumed that [the prolonged detentions] . . . are made largely on the basis 
of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional 
violation.”195 In neither case did the Court explicitly consider an Equal 
Protection claim, but lower courts have used the language from these 
cases in evaluating Equal Protection questions.196 
Some commentators have argued that the immigration cases are sui 
generis because “the border brings a unique set of circumstances that 
place these cases in a different category altogether.”197 But there is no 
language in the immigration cases to support that assertion.198 If the 
 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995). This lenient standard 
stands in stark contrast not just to Equal Protection claims in other criminal contexts, but also to 
Equal Protection claims in the civil context, in which the Supreme Court has stated that the Equal 
Protection Clause is triggered “[w]hen there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a 
motivating factor in the decision.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). 
 192. 62 F.3d 170 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 193. Id. at 174.  
 194. 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975). 
 195. 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 196. See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 353–55 (6th Cir. 1997) (forbidding the 
use of race in the “pre-contact” stage of criminal investigations if race is the only factor). 
 197. Sidhu, supra note 187, at 697; see sources cited supra note 134. The distinctive aspect 
of the border may make sense if the immigration cases were based on a special needs argument, 
but Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte are both cases involving crime control, not the special 
needs doctrine. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874–75; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545. 
 198. Professor Dawinder Sidhu argues that these cases are distinct because the Court stated: 
“Our decision in this case takes into account the special function of the Border Patrol.” Sidhu, 
supra note 187, at 697 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 n.8). But this language is taken 
out of context; the Court actually used that phrase to explain why the Border Patrol had less power 
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searches in the immigration cases were grounded in the special needs 
doctrine, based on the need to secure the border, then the lax 
constitutional standards they set out could be cabined off from the rest of 
Fourth Amendment or Equal Protection jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the 
Brignoni-Ponce Court is unclear as to whether the unique purpose of the 
border stops affects its legal analysis in the case.199  
Under Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, a suspect who brings an 
Equal Protection challenge cannot prevail unless he demonstrates that he 
was targeted solely because of his race.200 Some later courts have tried to 
limit this rule by holding that it only applies in the pre-contact stage, when 
officers are deciding whom to approach. For example, in the Sixth Circuit 
case of Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Ohio State Highway 
Patrol,201 the police officer defendants testified that they treated Hispanic 
motorists differently than white motorists in that “they would refer 
Hispanic motorists to the Border Patrol when, in precisely the same 
circumstances, they would not refer someone who was white (i.e., not of 
 
Border Patrol agents have no part in enforcing laws that regulate highway use, 
and their activities have nothing to do with an inquiry whether motorists and their 
vehicles are entitled, by virtue of compliance with laws governing highway 
usage, to be upon the public highways. Our decision thus does not imply that 
state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct such limited 
stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding drivers’ licenses, vehicle 
registration, truck weights, and similar matters. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 n.8. 
 199. On the one hand, the Court does state that stops based in part on race are justified 
“because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief 
stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
at 881. On the other hand, the Court refuted the Government’s argument that the proximity to the 
border gave law enforcement officers special powers: 
The Government also contends that the public interest in enforcing 
conditions on legal alien entry justifies stopping persons who may be aliens for 
questioning about their citizenship and immigration status. Although we may 
assume for purposes of this case that the broad congressional power over 
immigration authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will 
submit to reasonable questioning about their right to be and remain in the 
country, this power cannot diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens 
who may be mistaken for aliens. For the same reasons that the Fourth 
Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to inquire if they are carrying 
aliens who are illegally in the country, it also forbids stopping or 
detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a 
reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens. 
Id. at 883–84 (citation omitted). 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 213 F.3d 1021, 1022–23 (8th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174–75 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 201. 308 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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Hispanic appearance).”202 The court found that the plaintiffs had made 
out a prima facie Equal Protection claim because “[t]he ‘sole motive’ 
requirement . . . is an anomaly in equal protection law, and should not be 
applied outside the narrow factual context of purely consensual 
encounters.”203 However, this is not consistent with the holding in 
Martinez-Fuerte, in which the Court approved of using race as a factor in 
a non-consensual encounter after the suspect was detained. 
Since law enforcement officers can almost always testify as to some 
additional factors other than race that led them to stop or search a suspect, 
defendants rarely prevail under the Martinez-Fuerte test. One exception 
is State v. Maryland,204 in which two transit police officers stopped a 
Black suspect after they observed him “shove a brown paper bag into the 
waistband of his pants as he exited the train.”205 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that once the defendant raised a selective law enforcement 
claim under the Equal Protection Clause, “the State was required to have 
established a non-discriminatory basis for the officers to conduct a field 
inquiry.”206 The court held that the mere act of placing a paper bag in 
one’s waistband does not create any level of individualized suspicion and 
thus there was no non-discriminatory basis for the field inquiry.207 
B.  Proving Discriminatory Intent 
Although law enforcement officers occasionally acknowledge that 
race is a factor in their investigative process, such admissions are rare, 
and statutes that explicitly discriminate on the basis of race are long 
 
 202. Id. at 536. One of the state troopers who testified in the case said that “when he found 
Hispanic passengers hiding under a blanket, he called the Border Patrol, but that if he found white 
people hiding under a blanket, he would not;” another testified that she “once had contacted the 
Border Patrol after coming across two Hispanic men whose car had broken down, but that she 
wouldn’t do the same for a white man.” Id. at 535. 
 203. Id. at 538; see also United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(explaining that because the encounter between the police and the defendant was consensual, “it 
is unnecessary to consider or decide either the specific factual question of whether the officers’ 
surveillance of Taylor was motivated to any degree by his race, or the broader constitutional issue 
of whether the alleged incorporation of a racial component into the DEA’s drug courier profile 
would, if true, violate an individual’s rights to due process and equal protection of the laws”). 
 204. 771 A.2d 1220 (N.J. 2001). 
 205. Id. at 1223–24. 
 206. Id. at 1229. 
 207. See id. However, one of the reasons why the defendant won the case was that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court did not properly apply the Martinez-Fuerte test. Although the court 
correctly states the test, see id. at 1228, it uses a somewhat different test in its analysis later on, 
stating that “[b]ecause the totality of the record suggests that the hunch itself was, in our view, at 
least in part based on racial stereotyping, it was insufficient to rebut the inference of selective law 
enforcement that tainted the police conduct,” id. at 1229 (emphasis added). If the reason for the 
field inquiry was only in part based on racial stereotyping, then it would pass the Martinez-Fuerte 
test. 
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gone.208 Thus, most cases that challenge police conduct on Equal 
Protection grounds cannot rely on suspect classification to trigger strict 
scrutiny. Instead, defendants who bring Equal Protection cases must 
prove that the law enforcement action “had a discriminatory effect 
and . . . was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”209 Outside the law 
enforcement setting, such Equal Protection claims are brought in a 
number of contexts in the criminal justice system. For example, the 
defendant could show that the prosecutor used her peremptory strikes 
disproportionately against prospective jurors of a certain race;210 that 
prosecutors selectively prosecute certain defendants based on their 
race;211 that prosecutors disproportionately seek the death penalty for 
defendants of a certain race;212 or that members of a certain race are 
underrepresented in the jurisdiction’s grand juries.213  
In perhaps the most famous case alleging racial profiling in criminal 
investigations, the plaintiffs in Floyd v. City of New York214 successfully 
used a statistical discrepancy in the racial breakdown of stop-and-frisks 
to prove that the New York Police Department acted with discriminatory 
purpose.215 In that case, the statistical discrepancy was stark: although 
Blacks made up only 23% of the population of the city, they were the 
target of 52% of the frisks during the relevant eight-year period.216 The 
defendant’s expert explained this discrepancy by arguing that although 
the number of Black people who were stopped was disproportionate to 
the percentage of Black residents in the overall population, it was 
consistent with the percentage of Black individuals who were committing 
 
 208. See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The government 
has maintained for years, and equally asserts in this case, that it does not use race to select 
individuals for investigation.”). This is not exactly true—as this Article has shown, the 
government sometimes does acknowledge that it uses race as part of a profile to select individuals 
for investigation—but such acknowledgements are rare. See supra notes 96–114 and 
accompanying text. 
 209. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 240 (1976). If the law enforcement policy is race neutral on its face, a discriminatory effect 
is not sufficient for an Equal Protection claim unless there is also discriminatory intent. See 
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 901–02 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“[T]he discriminatory intent 
requirement arises when law enforcement operations that are race-neutral nevertheless produce 
racially disparate results. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court has determined that such 
policies are not violations of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is no discriminatory intent.” 
(citation omitted)), adhered to by No. CV–07–02513–PHX–GMS, 2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 210. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 470 (1996). 
 212. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987). 
 213. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). 
 214. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 215. Id. at 667. 
 216. Id. at 573–74. 
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crimes.217 The district court rejected this reasoning, arguing that the 
defendant’s numbers would only be relevant if the police were in fact 
stopping criminals; instead, the vast majority of individuals stopped by 
the police during the relevant period were innocent of any crime.218 Thus, 
it was inappropriate to use the racial breakdown of the criminal 
population as a benchmark. The Floyd court then went a step further and 
stated that the very argument being made by the defendant proved that 
the police officers acted with a discriminatory purpose; the city had, in 
effect, admitted that it was using race as at least one of the factors in 
determining who to stop: 
Rather than being a defense against the charge of racial 
profiling, however, this reasoning is a defense of racial 
profiling. To say that black people in general are somehow 
more suspicious-looking, or criminal in appearance, than 
white people is not a race-neutral explanation for racial 
disparities in NYPD stops: it is itself a racially biased 
explanation.219 
However, Floyd is an outlier. As with Equal Protection claims in other 
contexts, defendants often find it difficult to use statistical discrepancy to 
prove discriminatory intent in the criminal justice context.220 The seminal 
case on racial bias in the criminal justice system is McCleskey v. Kemp,221 
 
 217. Id. at 584 (“The City defends the fact that blacks and Hispanics represent 87% of the 
persons stopped in 2011 and 2012 by noting that ‘approximately 83% of all known crime suspects 
and approximately 90% of all violent crime suspects were Black and Hispanic.’”). 
 218. Id. at 585 (“As a result, there is no reason to believe that their racial distribution should 
resemble that of the local criminal population, as opposed to that of the local population in general. 
If the police are stopping people in a race-neutral way, then the racial composition of innocent 
people stopped should more or less mirror the racial composition of the areas where they are 
stopped, all other things being equal.”). 
 219. Id. at 587. 
 220. The Supreme Court explained this difficulty in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.:  
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence 
of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action—whether it “bears 
more heavily on one race than another”—may provide an important starting 
point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation 
appears neutral on its face. The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But 
such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion[, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960)] or Yick Wo[, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)], impact alone is not determinative, 
and the Court must look to other evidence. 
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).  
 221. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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in which a Black defendant argued that the state of Georgia engaged in 
racial discrimination when administering the death penalty.222 The 
defendant relied on a study that showed that defendants who killed white 
victims were far more likely to be sentenced to death than those who 
killed Black victims.223 The study also showed that Black defendants who 
killed white victims were more than twice as likely to get the death 
penalty than white defendants who killed white victims.224 The Supreme 
Court rejected the defendant’s arguments, holding that to prevail on an 
Equal Protection claim, the defendant had to demonstrate that the 
decisionmakers in the process acted with a “discriminatory purpose.”225 
The Justices were concerned with interfering with the discretion that is 
given to prosecutors, judges, and juries, and thus said it required 
“exceptionally clear proof before [the Court] would infer that the 
discretion has been abused.”226 
In the investigative context, plaintiffs might face an additional hurdle 
in demonstrating discriminatory “purpose” since the language of the 
Equal Protection test provides a very narrow definition of that term. The 
Supreme Court has held that “‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more 
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies 
that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of 
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.”227 An empirically demonstrable link 
between the suspect’s race and the likelihood of criminal activity would 
make it even harder to satisfy this test. 
This narrow definition of “discriminatory purpose” is not borne out in 
other areas of criminal procedure. For example, in the context of jury 
 
 222. Id. at 291–92. 
 223. Id. at 293 & n.11. 
 224. Id. at 286.  
 225. Id. at 292–93. 
 226. Id. at 297. The Court noted that, in some criminal procedure cases, it had accepted a 
statistical discrepancy alone as proof of an Equal Protection violation, but it said that statistical 
proof  “must present a ‘stark’ pattern to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent.” 
Id. at 293, 296. As an example of this “stark pattern,” the Court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 374 (1886), in which laundry operators had to apply for a permit to continue operation 
and “all but one of the white applicants received permits, but none of the over 200 Chinese 
applicants were successful.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n.12. 
 227. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Pers. 
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). In Feeney, the Court considered a 
Massachusetts law in which veterans were given hiring preferences for certain civil service 
positions. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1979). The Court found that 
over 98% of the veterans in Massachusetts were male. Id. at 270. Noting that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “guarantees equal laws, not equal results,” id. at 273, the Court held that the strong 
disparate impact on women caused by the veteran’s preference was not sufficient evidence of a 
discriminatory purpose, id. at 279–80. 
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selection, the Court held in Batson v. Kentucky228 that if a defendant 
established a pattern of racial discrimination in peremptory jury 
challenges, the prosecutor could only prevail if she could provide a 
racially neutral reason for making those challenges.229 The Court further 
noted that “the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case 
of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the 
defendant’s race on the assumption—or his intuitive judgment—that they 
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.”230 Thus, 
in the jury selection context, any use of race as a factor was sufficient to 
establish a discriminatory intent, even if it had the “legitimate” purpose 
of winnowing out jurors who would be less sympathetic to the 
prosecutor’s case.231 This rule is far less forgiving of the state than the 
traditional Equal Protection test as applied in McCleskey, and it stands in 
stark contrast to the extremely tolerant Martinez-Fuerte rule, which 
explicitly allows the use of race as a factor as long as the police can argue 
that race is related to criminal activity.232 
 
 228. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
 229. Id. at 97–98.  
 230. The Court argued:  
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons 
from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve 
as jurors, so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that 
they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. 
The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not 
discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the 
exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the 
jurors’ race. 
Id. at 97–98 (citation omitted). 
 231. See id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that using group affiliations such 
as race as a proxy for potential partiality was long viewed as “legitimate”). The Batson test was 
essentially the test used by the district court in Floyd v. City of New York, which alleged racial 
profiling in the city’s stop-and-frisk program: 
Once it is shown that a decision was motivated at least in part by a racially 
discriminatory purpose, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the same 
result would have been reached even without consideration of race. If the 
defendant comes forward with no such proof or if the trier of fact is unpersuaded 
that race did not contribute to the outcome of the decision, the equal protection 
claim is established. 
959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. City of 
Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 612 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 232. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563–64 (1976). Other 
commentators have leveraged similar critiques against the Martinez-Fuerte rule. See, e.g., Gross 
& Barnes, supra note 134, at 740–41 (“[N]o American court would ever uphold a death sentence 
under the Equal Protection Clause if the prosecutor admits that she asked for the death penalty in 
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The Martinez-Fuerte test appears to be even more of an outlier when 
compared to other Supreme Court cases involving racial discrimination 
in the criminal justice context. In two recent decisions, the Court has 
treated race-based decision-making as uniquely destructive to the 
criminal justice system. For example, in Buck v. Davis,233 an expert called 
by the defense attorney during the sentencing phase of a capital case 
testified that the fact that the defendant was Black increased the 
likelihood that he would commit a violent felony in the future.234 
Nevertheless, the defendant argued in a subsequent ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim that the original defense attorney’s conduct in calling 
the expert was deficient, and that his isolated comments during the 
sentencing phase constituted prejudice.235 The prejudice prong required 
a court to find “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”236 However, the expert only mentioned the alleged correlation 
between race and future dangerousness once on direct and once on cross 
examination, and overall the expert gave testimony that was positive to 
the defendant, opining that the defendant was unlikely to pose a danger 
in the future.237 Furthermore, the jury heard a substantial amount of 
evidence from the prosecutor supporting a finding of future 
dangerousness, including the horrific nature of his crime, the defendant’s 
apparent lack of remorse, and his multiple prior acts of violence against 
his girlfriend.238 Consequently, the district court reviewing Davis’s claim 
classified the defense attorney’s error as “de minimis,”239 and the circuit 
court termed it “unremarkable.”240 The Supreme Court strongly disagreed 
since “a basic premise of our criminal justice system” is to punish “people 
for what they do, not who they are.”241 The Court continued: 
This departure from basic principle was exacerbated 
because it concerned race. “Discrimination on the basis of 
race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the 
administration of justice.” Relying on race to impose a 
 
part because of the defendant’s race, regardless of any nonracial factors that entered into that 
decision. . . . McCleskey, however troublesome, made it difficult to prove discrimination in capital 
charging; it did not reach the absurd conclusion that equal protection is satisfied as long as a black 
defendant is not plucked at random from the population and executed solely because of his race.”). 
 233. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). 
 234. Id. at 768–69. 
 235. Id. at 770, 772. 
 236. Id. at 776 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
 237. See id. at 768–69.  
 238. Id. at 768. 
 239. Id. at 778 (quoting Buck v. Stephens, H–04–3965, 2014 WL 11310152, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 29, 2014)). 
 240. Id. at 778 (quoting Buck v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 668, 673 (5th Cir. 2015)).  
 241. Id. 
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criminal sanction “poisons public confidence” in the judicial 
process. It thus injures not just the defendant, but the “law as 
an institution, . . . the community at large, and . . . the 
democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.”242 
Less than one month later, the Court decided Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado,243 in which a Hispanic defendant challenged his conviction 
because a member of the jury made racist comments during 
deliberations.244 Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that 
evidence regarding internal jury deliberations are never admissible in a 
future proceeding;245 in the fifty-plus years since the rules were 
promulgated, the Supreme Court had never allowed any substantive 
exceptions to this rule.246 But the juror misconduct alleged in Peña-
Rodriguez was different: 
The behavior in [past cases challenging Rule 606(b)] is 
troubling and unacceptable, but each involved anomalous 
behavior from a single jury—or juror—gone off course. . . . 
The same cannot be said about racial bias, a familiar and 
recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic 
injury to the administration of justice. This Court’s decisions 
demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical, 
constitutional, and institutional concerns. An effort to 
address the most grave and serious statements of racial bias 
is not an effort to perfect the jury but to ensure that our legal 
system remains capable of coming ever closer to the promise 
of equal treatment under the law that is so central to a 
functioning democracy.247 
Both Buck and Peña-Rodriguez held that the defendant’s 
constitutional rights were violated if a defendant’s race could have in any 
way affected the jury’s decision.248 In this way, they flatly contradict 
Martinez-Fuerte.249 To be sure, neither Buck nor Peña-Rodriguez were 
Equal Protection cases.250 But the two cases do imply that if a future 
 
  242. Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979); then 
quoting Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015); and then quoting Rose, 443 U.S. at 556). 
 243. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
 244. Id. at 861–62. 
 245. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1). 
 246. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 122, 125–26 (1987) (forbidding jurors 
from testifying that other jurors were using drugs and alcohol during deliberations). The rules 
were amended to allow for testimony regarding whether a clerical mistake was made on the jury 
form. See Peña-Rodriquez, 137 S. Ct. at 864–65 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(C)). 
 247. Peña-Rodriquez, 137 S. Ct. at 868. 
 248. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775–77 (2017); Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869–70. 
 249. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563–64 (1976). 
 250. Of course, Martinez-Fuerte was technically not an Equal Protection case either, since 
the Court inexplicably never discussed the Equal Protection Clause in the decision. 
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Supreme Court is applying the Equal Protection Clause and needs to 
choose between a permissive Martinez-Fuerte standard that allows police 
to use race as a factor and a standard McCleskey test that triggers the 
Equal Protection Clause as soon as race is explicitly used as a factor, it 
should choose the latter.251 
C.  Narrowly Tailored to Meet a Compelling State Interest 
Even if a defendant is able to demonstrate discriminatory intent, the 
state can still win an Equal Protection challenge by arguing that the use 
of race was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.252 
Although the strict scrutiny test was once famously described as “‘strict’ 
in theory and fatal in fact,”253 the reality is that the government is often 
able to prevail under the strict scrutiny standard.254 This is especially true 
in cases involving criminal procedure since courts routinely determine 
that deterring and detecting criminal activity is a compelling state 
interest, and they rarely examine whether the investigative practice is 
narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 
Courts have been sympathetic to government claims that deterring 
criminal activity is a compelling state interest. With regard to 
investigations into drug trafficking, Justice Lewis Powell stated in a 
concurring opinion in United States v. Mendenhall255 that “[t]he public 
has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly 
 
 251. Civil cases which allege Equal Protection violations in the context of criminal 
investigations provide little guidance. As Professors Gross and Barnes note, many civil cases are 
dismissed for lack of proof or on summary judgment; almost all of those that do survive result in 
a settlement in which the police department agrees it will not use race as a factor in its criminal 
investigations. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 134, at 743. Civil cases brought by the Department 
of Justice result in similar consent decrees restricting the defendant police departments. Id.  
 252. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 253. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). The Court itself has adopted this terminology. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 
219 n.6 (1984); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (defining “conventional ‘strict scrutiny”’ as “scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact” (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (joint opinion 
of Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.))), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 254. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795–96 (2006). Professor Winkler studied 
every strict scrutiny decision by the federal courts between 1900 and 2003 and found that 27% of 
the applications of strict scrutiny based on racial classification resulted in the law being upheld. 
Id. at 795, 839 tbl.6. However, most of the cases that survive strict scrutiny in the Winkler study 
may not have much applicability to the use of race in criminal investigations, since most of the 
laws which survive strict scrutiny are those that are remedial affirmative action laws meant to 
remedy past discrimination. See id. at 839–40. In contrast, the use of race in criminal 
investigations almost always reinforces past invidious discrimination against non-whites. 
 255. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).  
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drugs for personal profit.”256 The Mendenhall Court was not considering 
an Equal Protection claim, but lower courts have adopted this language 
in Equal Protection cases to prove that detecting drug dealing is a 
compelling state interest. In Travis,257 for example, the trial court upheld 
a law enforcement practice that disproportionately targeted Blacks by 
quoting from Justice Powell’s Mendenhall concurrence.258 
In keeping with the pattern seen elsewhere, judicial deference to law 
enforcement regarding the compelling nature of the interest is even 
greater in the immigration context. In a recent immigration pre-emption 
case, the Supreme Court cited statistics from an anti-immigration group 
as evidence that unauthorized aliens are “responsible for a 
disproportionate share of serious crime.”259 The Court went on to cite the 
state of Arizona’s arguments, which claimed that the influx of illegal 
migration into the state was responsible for an “epidemic of crime, safety 
risks, serious property damage, and environmental problems,” to 
conclude that “[t]he problems posed to the State by illegal immigration 
must not be underestimated.”260  
Even if the state’s goal is a compelling interest, the government should 
fail a strict scrutiny test unless the law or practice is a narrowly tailored 
means of furthering those governmental interests. What does this mean 
in the context of criminal investigations? At the very least, it must mean 
 
 256. Id. at 561 (Powell, J, concurring). Justice Powell justified his compelling interest 
finding by arguing: 
Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our population, particularly our 
young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances. 
Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophisticated 
criminal syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many drugs, including 
heroin, may be easily concealed. As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal 
conduct may be unmatched in any other area of law enforcement. 
Id. at 561–62.  
 257. 837 F. Supp. 1386 (E.D. Ky. 1993), aff’d, 62 F.3d 170 (6th Cir. 1995).  
 258. Id. at 1389, 1395–96; see supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 259. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012) (citing statistics from the Center for 
Immigration Studies which estimated that unauthorized aliens constitute 8.9% of the population 
and are responsible for 21.8% of the felonies in Maricopa County). The Center for Immigration 
Studies is a strongly partisan anti-immigrant organization that was co-founded by a white 
nationalist and has been described as a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center. See Jason 
DeParle, The Anti-Immigration Crusader, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/17/us/17immig.html [https://perma.cc/RP79-Y6PV]; Amy Sherman, Is the Center for 
Immigration Studies a Hate Group, as the Southern Law Poverty Center Says?, POLITIFACT (Mar. 
22, 2017), https://www.politifact.com/florida/article/2017/mar/22/center-immigration-studies-
hate-group-southern-pov/ [https://perma.cc/54HU-FHPF]. 
 260. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 398; see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 901 (D. 
Ariz. 2013) (“The enforcement of immigration-related civil or criminal offenses amounts to a 
compelling governmental interest.”), adhered to by No. CV–07–02513–PHX–GMS, 2013 WL 
5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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more than the fact that using race increases the accuracy of law 
enforcement’s predictions of criminal behavior, which is the standard 
under the Fourth Amendment.261 In a seminal article on racial profiling, 
Professor Bernard Harcourt proposes that using race as a factor in 
criminal investigations is narrowly tailored “only if the policing practices 
do not create a ratchet effect on the profiled population.”262 A “ratchet 
effect” means that the practice produces hit rates disproportionate to the 
actual crime rate of the profiled population.263 In other words, if 25% of 
the criminals who commit a certain crime are Black, but Black citizens 
are being stopped, searched, or arrested at a rate higher than 25%, then 
the race-based investigative technique is not narrowly tailored.  
Professor Harcourt’s test is surely a good method for evaluating the 
practice of racial profiling generally,264 but it does not find much support 
in the actual Equal Protection Clause caselaw. Instead, it focuses 
primarily on the accuracy of the criminal investigative technique, which 
is related to whether the search is legitimate under the Fourth 
Amendment.265 Professor Adam Winkler has proposed a better test for 
whether the use of race is “narrowly tailored” to meet the compelling state 
interest of crime control: ask whether the state action “capture[s] within 
its reach no more activity . . . than is necessary to advance those 
compelling ends.”266 In other words, courts should determine whether 
using race is the “least restrictive” alternative to achieve the compelling 
state interest.267 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied this test in 
Hassan v. City of New York,268 when Islamic citizens alleged that they 
were subjects of widespread police surveillance in New York City based 
on their religious beliefs.269 Hassan applied strict scrutiny and agreed 
with the government that providing security from terrorism was a 
 
 261. See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text. 
 262. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil 
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1275, 1280 (2004). 
 263. Id. at 1280, 1329.  
 264. See id. at 1329–35 (explaining the ratchet effect test and making a compelling argument 
that racial profiling techniques which violate this test have numerous negative effects on society). 
 265. See id. at 1335, 1341. 
 266. Winkler, supra note 254, at 800. 
 267. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]he classification at issue must ‘fit’ with greater precision than any alternative means.” 
(quoting John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974))); see Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
718 (1981) (describing strict scrutiny in the First Amendment context). 
 268. 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 269. See id. at 284–85. 
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compelling state interest.270 However, the court held that the state had the 
burden of proving a link between the means and the end:  
[H]eightened scrutiny requires that the relationship between 
the asserted justification and discriminatory means 
employed “be substantiated by objective evidence.” “[M]ere 
speculation or conjecture is insufficient,” as are appeals to 
“‘common sense’ which might be inflected by stereotypes.”  
And “[e]ven in the limited circumstance” where a suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification “is permissible to further [an 
important or] compelling state interest, the government is 
still ‘constrained in how it may pursue that end.’” While “[a] 
classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is 
not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it 
results in some inequality,” strict scrutiny requires that “the 
classification at issue . . . ‘fit’ with greater precision than any 
alternative means.”271 
Unfortunately, Hassan is an outlier. In fact, most courts do not even 
consider an Equal Protection argument when evaluating the use of race 
in criminal investigations.272 When courts do discuss the Equal Protection 
 
 270. Id. at 306. 
 271. Id. (all alterations except the first in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 2002); then quoting 
Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2002); and then quoting Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003); and then quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993); 
and then quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion)). The Third Circuit 
was ruling on the Government’s appeal of a motion to dismiss, so it did not reach the question of 
whether the Government met this burden. Id. The Government later settled the case, agreeing to 
cease its suspicionless surveillance based on religion and pay damages to mosques and businesses 
for income lost as a result of the surveillance. See Settlement Reached in NYPD Muslim 
Surveillance Lawsuit, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-
center/press-releases/settlement-reached-nypd-muslim-surveillance-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/B 
W5M-H5KR]. 
 272. Martinez-Fuerte is probably the most prominent example of this phenomenon; although 
the border patrol officers were using race as a factor in deciding whether to pull over suspects, the 
Supreme Court did not discuss the Equal Protection Clause. See 428 U.S. 543, 563–64 (1976). 
Instead, it treated the use of race as it would any other factor under the Fourth Amendment, 
allowing border patrol agents to rely in part on the race of the suspect as long as it was “relevant 
to the law enforcement need.” Id. at 564 n.17 (“Thus, to the extent that the Border Patrol relies on 
apparent Mexican ancestry at this checkpoint, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law 
enforcement need to be served.” (citation omitted)). For an example of a case in which the 
Supreme Court allowed the INS to conduct “surveys” to check for undocumented aliens at certain 
workplaces, see INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984). The Court held that these surveys did 
not constitute “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 221, but it never considered the 
Equal Protection question as to why the INS was focused on this specific workplace. Indeed, the 
propriety of using race as a factor in immigration enforcement was so uncontroversial that the 
dissent did not even raise the issue. See id. at 225–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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claims, however, they usually do not require the state to produce 
objective evidence to link the discriminatory means to the compelling 
state interest of crime control.273 
CONCLUSION 
When considering the constitutionality of race as a factor in criminal 
investigations, courts need to analyze the practice under both the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Courts have generally done 
a poor job with both analyses. For the use of race to be a legitimate factor 
under the Fourth Amendment, the government must prove that the 
suspect’s race makes criminal activity more likely. This means the 
government must provide evidence that a significant percentage of people 
of that ethnicity commit the crime and that there is a significant difference 
in the crime rate between people of that ethnicity and people of other 
ethnicities. Even in the immigration context, where the link between race 
and criminal conduct may seem the most intuitive, the government has 
consistently failed to present such evidence. 
For the Equal Protection context, the courts must choose among the 
various different tests they have been using in the criminal justice context. 
Under the Batson rule used in jury selection, any use of race is 
impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause, even if it is correlated 
to a legitimate purpose. According to Batson, any disproportionate effect 
on a suspect class triggers a burden shifting that requires the state to prove 
the disparity is merely a coincidence, and that a race-neutral reason 
explains the real motivation for the statistical anomaly. But under the 
standard Equal Protection test as applied in McKleskey, a showing that 
the state’s action disproportionately affects a suspect class is insufficient; 
the defendant must also prove that the state made its choices at least in 
part because of the suspect’s race, and even a dramatic statistical disparity 
 
 273. See Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, 310 F.3d at 53. It is worth noting that even if a 
defendant were able to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the appropriate remedy 
in the criminal law context is unclear. The Supreme Court has explicitly left the question of 
remedy open, while lower courts have held that the proper remedy is to bring a § 1983 action 
against the police. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 n.2 (1996) (“We have never 
determined whether dismissal of the indictment, or some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a 
court determines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his race.”); 
United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds, Arizona 
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), as recognized in United States v. Buford, 632 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 
2011). Some commentators have proposed applying the exclusionary rule to Equal Protection 
violations. See Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an 
Exclusionary Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107, 1110, 1118–
19 (2000); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2001, 2004–05 (1998). However, no court has ever accepted this proposal, and the Supreme 
Court has moved in the opposite direction, seeking to limit the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule in the Fourth Amendment context. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). 
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may not be enough. Under the Martinez-Fuerte rule used in immigration 
cases, the state can explicitly use race as a factor in their criminal 
investigation as long as it can prove that race is related to criminal activity 
and that law enforcement used other factors as well. This Article argues 
that courts should conform the Equal Protection Clause doctrine in the 
criminal context to its application in civil cases, as it did in McCleskey. 
Thus, statistical disparity on its own will likely not be enough evidence 
to apply the Equal Protection Clause, not even to shift the burden as in 
Batson. But any explicit use of race—as part of a profile or as part of an 
argument that members of that race are more likely to commit the 
suspected crime—should trigger strict scrutiny.  
Once the Equal Protection Clause is triggered, the court should move 
to the second part of the Equal Protection analysis: whether the targeting 
of the suspect class is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government 
interest. In the jury selection context governed by Batson, the Court has 
determined that targeting a suspect class can never pass this test. But in 
the criminal investigation context, the state could conceivably make the 
necessary showing. Courts seem willing to find that crime control is a 
compelling state interest; to pass the narrowly tailored prong, police or 
prosecutors must be required to demonstrate that using race is the least 
restrictive alternative to achieving the compelling state interest. 
Unfortunately, most courts have failed to demand the evidence necessary 
to conduct the appropriate analysis to confirm that the government policy 
survives strict scrutiny. 
Given the long history of police officers improperly using race in 
criminal investigations, and the strong policy interest in deterring the 
practice, the Supreme Court could create a requirement of judicial pre-
clearance before the police are permitted to use race as an explicit factor 
in determining probable cause.274 For example, if law enforcement 
officers want to institute an interdiction program that uses a profile for 
drug smuggling, terrorism, immigration violations, or any other crime, 
they must first go to a judge and prove that their profiling conforms to 
both the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. To pass the 
Fourth Amendment test, the police must show that using race as a factor 
increases the likelihood that the individual is engaged in criminal activity 
in the context of the profile. Ordinarily this would mean that the police 
have evidence that a significant percentage of people of that ethnicity 
commit the crime and that there is a significant difference in the crime 
rate between people of that ethnicity and people of other ethnicities. In 
order to comply with the Equal Protection Clause, law enforcement 
would have to pass strict scrutiny, demonstrating that no other means are 
 
 274. Thanks to Professor Laurent Sacharoff for the suggestion of judicial pre-clearance. 
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available for meeting the compelling state interest of crime control in this 
context.  
Under this rule, police who conduct a warrantless arrest could not 
explicitly cite the race of the defendant as a factor in justifying the arrest. 
Criminal defendants could still seek to prove that race was an implicit or 
hidden factor, but they would then have to meet the McCleskey standard 
and demonstrate a disparate impact and discriminatory purpose. This 
would conform the criminal procedure law with the Equal Protection 
standards from other fields. And, as Floyd shows,275 it is difficult but not 
impossible for criminal defendants to meet this standard. 
It is entirely feasible—perhaps likely—that predictive algorithms 
used by police in the future will produce demonstrably greater accuracy 
if race is used as a factor. Thus, the only way to prohibit this practice will 
be to consistently enforce the appropriate Equal Protection test and force 
the state to pass a strict scrutiny test if race is ever used as a factor in a 
criminal investigation. Unfortunately, the courts have already shown 
their willingness to accept the use of race in immigration cases without 
the appropriate evidence to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment and 
without applying the appropriate Equal Protection test. As long as these 
cases remain good law, their flawed statistical analysis and lenient Equal 
Protection treatment will continue to seep into general criminal procedure 




 275. See supra notes 214–219 and accompanying text. 
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